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ABSTRACT

This Article proposes a public enforcement model for the
fiduciary duties of corporate directors. Under the dominant
model of corporate governance, the principal function of the
board of directors is to oversee the conduct of senior corporate
officials. When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the
consequences can be severe for shareholders, creditors,
employees, and society at large.
Despite general agreement on the importance of director
oversight, courts have yet to develop a coherent doctrine
governing director liability for the breach of oversight duties. In
Delaware, the dominant state for U.S. corporate law, the courts
tout the importance of board oversight in dicta, yet emphasize in
holdings that directors cannot be personally liable for oversight
failures, absent evidence that they intentionally violated their
duties.
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We argue that some form of external enforcement
mechanism is necessary to ensure optimal conduct from
corporate leaders. Unfortunately, the disciplinary force of
shareholder litigation has been vitiated by proceduralrules and
doctrines that make it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to
prevail in derivative litigation. Because private shareholder
litigation no longer fulfills its traditional role, the need exists
for alternative mechanisms for directoraccountability.
We look to Australian corporate law for solutions to the
problem of enforcing the duty of oversight. Australian corporate
law encompasses a range of enforcement mechanisms for
directors' duties. The Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC) has power to sue to enforce directors'
statutory duties. ASIC can seek a range of penalties for breach
of duty, including pecuniary penalties and officer and director
bars. ASIC has prevailed in a number of high-profile actions
against directors of public companies in recent years. Despite
the relative rigor of enforcement in Australia, capable directors
continue to serve and its economy has thrived.
The Article explores several possibilities for incorporating
public enforcement into the U.S. corporate governance system.
We consider SEC enforcement of fiduciary duties and
enforcement by states' attorneys general. We also consider
empowering state judges to impose bars on future service, as an
alternative to tort-based damages awards. Regardless of the
exact model of public enforcement, the reforms advanced here
would help provide for greater director accountability and thus
better motivate directors to perform their duties responsibly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The precipitous collapse of many of our major financial
institutions has revealed significant flaws in the U.S. corporate
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governance regime. Public inquiries into the failure of Bear Stearns,
Lehman Brothers, and Citigroup consistently portray directors as
oblivious to the scope of the risks their firms had undertaken.
Directors remained blind to significant departures from approved risk
management guidelines and failed to detect flaws in financial
reporting practices that led to systematic underreporting of leverage
and the concealment of devastating losses.
Since the 2008 financial collapse, Congress and financial
regulators have adopted major reforms designed to prevent the
recurrence of such calamities. Similarly, in 2002, Congress, the SEC
and self-regulatory organizations adopted reforms aimed at
preventing future financial frauds. Despite these major federal
reform initiatives, a basic corporate governance problem remains
unresolved. The 2001-2002 corporate governance scandals and the
2008 financial crisis have laid bare a basic reality. Directors are not
providing the kind of corporate oversight that forms a fundamental
tenet of the monitoring model of corporate governance.
The director's role as corporate monitor serves as an article of
faith among most corporate theorists. Prestigious institutions, from
the American Law Institute to the Business Roundtable, embrace the
monitoring model. The monitoring model forms the basis of the
Sarbanes-Oxley reforms that sought to strengthen the hand of
independent directors vis-a-vis corporate management. Likewise,
state judges, who act as principal enforcers of fiduciary duties,
consistently emphasize the importance of board oversight. In judicial
opinions and outside commentary, judges urge directors to pay
attention, stay informed, and act as vigilant monitors of the conduct
of corporate managers.
Despite broad acceptance of the monitoring model, courts have
yet to develop a coherent doctrine governing director liability for the
breach of oversight duties. In Delaware, the dominant state for U.S.
corporate law, courts curiously tout the importance of board oversight
in dicta, yet emphasize in holdings that directors cannot be
personally liable for oversight failures, absent evidence that they
intentionally violated their duties. 1 While setting a high bar for
liability, courts have offered little guidance about the kinds of facts
that would satisfy this arduous standard.
Many commentators defend this laissez-faire approach to
enforcing directors' duties. 2 They argue that the law should stand

See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (affirming that a
1.
necessary condition for director oversight liability is "intentionally fail[ing] to act in the
face of a known duty to act").
See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
2.
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 90-98 (1991) (arguing that market discipline usually
serves an adequate alternative to director liability for breach of fiduciary duty);
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
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aside to let private forces such as the market and social norms
promote responsible conduct among corporate officials. These
commentators maintain that a rigorous liability regime would harm
shareholder interests by discouraging risk taking and deterring
qualified directors from serving.3 The risk of unfair hindsight bias,
litigation costs, and shareholders' asserted ability to limit their risk
exposure through portfolio diversification serve as further rationales
4
for shielding directors from liability.
Another reason courts refrain from enforcing the duty of
oversight is that the penalties seem harsh when compared to an
outside director's degree of responsibility for the alleged harm. 5 To
avoid reaching what is perceived as an unjust result, courts have too
often spared directors from any consequence for their failure to
perform their core function. 6 This unwillingness to enforce the duty to
monitor leaves directors with little guidance on the content of their
duties, contributing to the kind of board passivity associated with
recent corporate collapses.
When directors fail to provide proper oversight, the consequences
can be severe for corporations, investors, employees, and society at
large. Although markets and social factors can influence director
behavior, some form of external discipline is necessary to ensure optimal

the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2001) (arguing that
firms exist to replace legal governance with non-legally-enforceable governance
mechanisms).
3.
See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN.L. REV. 1055, 1140 (2006) ("[T]he limited out-of-pocket risk that we
observe may well be sensible from a policy perspective."); cf. In re Caremark Int'l Inc.
Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[A] demanding test of liability in
the oversight context is probably beneficial to corporate shareholders as a
class ... since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely ....
").
4.
See E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in
Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A Retrospective on Some
Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1422-35 (2005) (describing the problems of
encouraging risk aversion and hindsight bias as justifications for deference to director
decisions).
5.
See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms and the Breakdown of the Board:
PromotingAccountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 148-50 (2006)
(discussing judicial nullification of corporate law rules); see also Donald C. Langevoort,
Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARiz. L. REV. 639, 663-66
(1996) (discussing the impact of draconian damages in the context of securities
litigation).
6.
See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the
Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 261, 317 (1981) (discussing the "tendency of the law to nullify extreme penalties
and to distort the substantive law in an effort to avoid punishments that do not fit the
crime"); Langevoort, supra note 5, at 655 (noting that because directors are poorly
situated to monitor, large damages awards against outside directors may not provide
effective deterrence).
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7
conduct. The shareholder lawsuit was created to serve this function.
Unfortunately, the disciplinary force of shareholder litigation has
been vitiated by procedural rules and doctrines that make it
exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in derivative litigation.
Because private shareholder litigation no longer fulfills its traditional
role, the need exists for alternative mechanisms for director
accountability.
We look to Australian corporate law for possible solutions to the
8
problem of enforcing the duty of oversight. U.S. and Australian
corporate law both emerge from the "Anglo-American" common law
tradition. Thus, the United States and Australia share the same basic
corporate governance structure. Like the United States, Australia has
a highly developed economy with sophisticated trading markets,
characterized by dispersed share ownership. 9 In recent decades
however, Australia has revamped its corporate law system,
confronting the difficulties that federalism posed to maintaining
uniform national standards and bolstering mechanisms for enforcing
10
the obligations of corporate officers and directors. Thus, despite a
shared legal tradition, enforcement practices in Australia now
diverge significantly from U.S. custom."

See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW 442
7.
(3d ed. 2011) ("Shareholder derivative suits are the principal remedy by which
defrauded minority shareholders may call directors, officers, promoters and controlling
shareholders to account for mismanagement, diversion of assets, and fraudulent
manipulation of corporate affairs."); Ann M. Scarlett, A Better Approach for Balancing
Authority and Accountability in ShareholderDerivative Litigation, 57 U. KAN. L. REV.
39, 57 (2008) ("Shareholder derivative litigation constitutes the formal method of
accountability in the corporate context.").
We draw a comparative portrait between the United States and Australia
8.
with a simple and pragmatic purpose. Our goal is to discern possible solutions to a set
of seemingly intractable problems by studying how a different approach to enforcing
directors' duties has fared abroad. We find the Australian comparison fruitful because
that country has implemented several policies that U.S. commentators often assert
would have disastrous impact on our economy. Thus, Australia can serve, in a manner,
as a laboratory for testing some of the strongest arguments invoked in defense of the
United States' lax director liability regime.
Share ownership is more concentrated in Australia than in the United
9.
States. See Jennifer G. Hill, Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, ComparingCEO
Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia and the United States,
64 VAND. L. REV. 559, 561 (2011) (characterizing shareholding ownership in U.S.
capital markets as dispersed while acknowledging that this is not the case in
Australia). However, recent studies show that share ownership in both countries is
more concentrated than commonly believed. Id. at 561 n.7.
See infra note 148 (discussing the evolution of a national corporate law
10.
regime in Australia).
For prior articles that compare directors' duties and enforcement in the
11.
United States and Australia, see Brian R. Cheffins & Bernard S. Black, Outside
Director Liability Across Countries, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1385 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007);
Jennifer G. Hill, Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J.
367 (2005) [hereinafter Hill, Regulatory Responses]; Jennifer G. Hill, Subverting
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The Australian example matters in part because its financial
regulatory system has drawn the attention of commentators in the
United States and throughout the world. Its "twin peaks" approach to
financial regulation has been held up as a model for global financial
reform initiatives. 12 Under twin peaks, responsibility for financial
regulation is divided according to regulatory objectives, with a
systemic risk regulator and a business conduct regulator. 13 The twin
peaks approach figured prominently in former Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson's "Blueprint" for financial reform and in the Group of
30's similar set of recommendations. 14 Although the Blueprint and
the G-30 report recommend that the United States adopt a version of
the twin peaks model, these proposals pay little heed to important
differences in the authority of the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC) when compared with the U.S.
financial regulators.
15
In Australia, ASIC functions as the business conduct regulator.
ASIC has the power to sue to enforce the statutory duties of all
corporate directors and can seek a range of penalties including
pecuniary penalties and officer and director bars. In recent years,
ASIC has prevailed in a number of high-profile actions against
directors of public companies. Yet, despite the relative rigor of
Australia's enforcement system, the parade of horribles that
commentators insist would follow from imposing liability on outside
directors has not occurred. In fact, Australia has fared far better than

Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp.'s Migration to Delaware, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (2010); Cindy A. Schipani, Defining the Corporate Directors' Duty of Care
Standardin the United States and Australia,4 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 152 (1994).
12.

See MICHAEL TAYLOR, TWIN PEAKS: A REGULATORY STRUCTURE FOR THE

NEW CENTURY 1 (1995) (proposing a financial regulatory structure designed around the
twin peaks of prudential regulation and investors and consumer protection); John C.
Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 715, 782 (2009) (endorsing the "twin peaks" model as part of
a new financial regulatory structure).
13.
This contrasts with the functional model in place in the United States
where regulatory authority is allocated according to business function with multiple
regulators overseeing various aspects of the operations of large financial
conglomerates. See GRP. OF THIRTY, THE STRUCTURE OF FINANCIAL SUPERVISION:
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 14-15, 34-35 (2009),

available at http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/The%2OStructure%20of%20Financial
%20Supervision.pdf (describing the U.S. approach to financial regulation as functional
with some aspects of an institutional model).
14.
See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 141-50 (2008), available at

http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf
(discussing
the benefits of twin peaks' "objectives based" approach to financial regulation); GRP. OF
THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 34 (2009), available

at
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/FinancialReform-AFrameworkforFinancial
_Stability.pdf (arguing for a variant of the twin peaks approach to financial supervision).
15.
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(1)
(Austl.).
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16
the United States in the wake of the recent global financial crisis.
Unlike the United States, no major Australian banks failed during
17
the crisis.
This Article explores several possibilities for implementing
public enforcement of directors' duties in the United States. We first
consider SEC enforcement of fiduciary duties. We then assess
enforcement by states' attorneys general. We also consider
empowering state judges to impose sanctions for oversight breaches,
such as a bar on future service, as an alternative to tort-based
damage awards. Although we acknowledge obstacles to adopting a
public enforcement regime in the United States, the proposed reforms
are less radical than they may appear at first blush.
The SEC already has power to bring enforcement actions against
directors for conduct that in substance constitutes a breach of fiduciary
duty. Similarly, state regulators enjoy power to enforce the duties of
directors of nonprofit corporations. 18 Because ample precedent exists
for public enforcement of fiduciary duties, expanding regulators'
authority to enforce the duties of directors of business corporations
would be a logical extension of existing law and practice.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the U.S.
corporate governance system and outlines obstacles to enforcing
directors' oversight duties. The Article connects the failure of
American courts to enforce the duty of oversight with a culture of
inattention and passivity that seems to pervade the contemporary
corporate boardroom. Part III addresses the main arguments courts
and scholars invoke to defend the lax director liability regime. It
examines the various factors that motivate individuals to comply with
their legal obligations by surveying existing literature on law
compliance. It concludes that although social and normative factors
influence compliance, a need still exists for external accountability
mechanisms for corporate directors. Part IV provides an overview of
Australia's corporate law enforcement regime, focusing on public
enforcement actions by ASIC. Part V then identifies elements of

16.
The global financial crisis had less of an impact in Australia than it did in
many other countries. For example, Australia managed to avoid a recession and the
current seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate is 5.1 percent. Labour Force,
Australia, Jul 2011, AUSTL. BUREAU STAT., http://www.abs.gov.auIAUSSTATS/
abs@.nsf/allprimarymainfeatures/8E87BDFA74F2BD55CA2579040013C94D?opendocu
ment (last updated Sept. 11, 2011).
17.
The reasons that Australia managed to avoid the fallout of the global
financial crisis lie beyond the scope of this Article. We simply note that Australia has
experienced greater economic stability than the United States despite maintaining a
more rigorous corporate regulatory regime. For a discussion of some reasons why
Australia fared comparatively well in the global financial crisis, see generally
Elizabeth F. Brown, A Comparison of The Handling of The Financial Crisis in the
United States, The United Kingdom, and Australia, 55 VILL. L. REV. 509 (2010).
18.
See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 785-86 (8th
ed. 2009) (discussing attorney general oversight of charities).
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Australia's public enforcement system that merit consideration in the
United States. It highlights the bar on future service as a remedy
that would enhance the accountability of corporate officials. It also
explores several possible approaches to adopting such reforms and
addresses likely obstacles to implementation. Part VI concludes.

II.

THE FAILURE TO ENFORCE OVERSIGHT DUTIES IN
THE UNITED STATES

A. The Monitoring Model of CorporateGovernance
In the United States, corporate statutes vest directors with the
power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 19
Because directors have the legal power to direct a corporation's
affairs, they also bear the burden of exercising such power
responsibly. Thus corporate law imposes fiduciary duties of loyalty
and care on directors. In the modern corporation, directors delegate
their management power to officers who run the day-to-day affairs of
the corporation. Although such delegation is proper, directors are
expected to oversee the conduct of senior officers in their execution of
management functions. Thus, in theory at least, directors remain
responsible for anything that goes wrong on their watch.
Although this delegation of authority is the accepted norm, the
legal regime still expects directors to do "something." Exactly what
this "something" entails can be difficult to discern, as a wide gap
exists between ideal director conduct expressed by popular "best
practice" standards, and the minimum level of performance necessary
to shield directors from liability for a corporation's losses. 20 Although
the precise steps a director must take to fulfill his duties in any given
context remains unclear, courts and commentators agree on the
general contours of a director's obligations.
The most significant obligation of the modern corporate director
is to oversee the conduct of corporate executives. 21 This oversight

19.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) ("The business and affairs of
every corporation.., shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors.").
20.
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993)
("[S]tandards of review in corporate law pervasively diverge from the standards of
conduct.").
21.

See

PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE:

ANALYSIS

AND

RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 (Revisions to the Proposed Final Draft 1992) (discussing the
oversight functions and responsibilities of a board of directors); BUS. ROUNDTABLE,
PRINCIPLES

OF

CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

7

(2010),

available

http:/Ibusinessroundtable.org/uploads/studies-reports/downloads/2010_Principles-of
CorporateGovernance-l.pdf (describing the roles of corporate directors

at

and
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duty is broad, but can be divided into several distinct components.
First, at a minimum, directors must pay some attention to the
corporation's affairs. They must understand the business, review
financial statements, and attend board meetings. 22 Directors should
participate actively in meetings by reviewing relevant documents and
asking questions before making important decisions. 23 If at any time
directors sense that something is awry, they must inquire further,
24
and consult experts or hire lawyers if necessary.
Courts also expect the board to monitor the corporation's
compliance with law. Directors must establish a monitoring system
designed to prevent, detect, and correct a corporation's violations of
law. 25 In addition to monitoring law compliance, directors bear
responsibility for overseeing the corporation's financial reporting
system. Although directors do not prepare or audit financial reports,
they must oversee the work of the audit firm. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 affirms directors' obligations in this regard. 26 Sarbanes-Oxley
makes clear that directors must hire the auditors, set their
compensation and meet regularly with them to discuss the company's
most significant financial reporting issues. 27 The audit committee of
28
the board of directors bears the bulk of this responsibility.
More recently, courts and scholars have begun to focus on
directors' responsibility for overseeing corporate risk. 29 Although risk

management); COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
POLICIES
2.7 (2011), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/council /20policies/
CII%2OCorp%20Gov% 20Policies%20Full%20and%20Current%2012-21-11%20FINAL.pdf
(describing the board's role in risk oversight).
22.
Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-23 (N.J. 1981); see also
Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896-97 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding director liable for failing
to monitor the actions of bank president, who was also his son); FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ,
CORPORATION LAW 280 (2d ed. 2010) ("The vast majority of opinions, however, are
consistent with Francisin demanding that directors pay some attention to their role.").
23.
COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, at 203.
24.
See Hoye, 795 F.2d at 896 ("Where suspicions are aroused, or should be
aroused, it is the directors' duty to make necessary inquiries."); Francis, 432 A.2d at
823 ("[Tlhe fulfillment of the duty of a director may call for more than mere objection
and resignation. Sometimes a director may be required to seek the advice of counsel.").
25.
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 368-69 (Del. 2006) (endorsing and
applying Caremark's legal compliance rule); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (stating that corporate boards must "assur[e]
themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the organization" in order
to satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed).
26.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
27.
Id. § 301 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)).
28.
Id.
29.
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk
Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 967-68 (2009) (examining liability of corporate
directors for failures in risk management during the 2008 financial crisis); Franklin A.
Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a FinancialCrisis:Reflections on In
re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 MCGEORGE PAC. GLOBAL Bus.
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management does not fall squarely within directors' traditional
duties, the financial crisis has highlighted the importance of director
engagement on this issue. 30 Commentators have also taken note of
how executive compensation schemes seem to promote a short-term
focus, creating incentives for managers to take unreasonable risks in
pursuit of short-term gains. 3 1 The prevalence of incentives to engage
in reckless risk taking increases the need for directors to closely
monitor operational risk.
B. Enforcing the Duty to Monitor
1.

The Derivative Suit

In theory, a director's failure to fulfill his fiduciary duty exposes
him to personal liability for any damages the corporation or its
shareholders suffer as a result of the breach. The derivative lawsuit
gives shareholders power to bring a suit in the name of the
corporation for breach of fiduciary duty. 32 Traditionally, the
derivative suit has served as the principal mechanism for enforcing
directors' duties. 33 For a variety of reasons, however, the shareholder
suit has ceased to function as an effective disciplinary tool. First, a
range of judicial doctrines, procedural rules, statutory protections,
and contractual arrangements protect directors from any real risk of
personal liability. 34 In addition, Delaware courts have imposed a low
substantive standard when assessing director performance.

& DEV. J. 113, 113-20 (2010) (discussing the role of excessive risk in Citigroup's near
collapse); Robert T. Miller, Oversight Liability for Risk-Management Failures at
FinancialFirms, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 47, 54-57 (2010) (reviewing recent literature on
oversight liability suits); Eric J. Pan, Rethinking the Board's Duty to Monitor: A
CriticalAssessment of the Delaware Doctrine, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 209, 225-31 (2011)
(assessing a board's duty to monitor business risk).
30.
See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 123
(Del. Ch. 2009) (assessing a Caremark claim against directors for their alleged failures
to properly monitor the riskiness of subprime mortgage investments).
31.
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay,
98 GEO. L.J. 247, 262-67 (2010) (describing how bankers' compensation structures
encourage excessive risk taking); Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming
Executive Compensation:Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON
REG. 359, 362-64 (2009) (proposing a requirement that executives retain all equity
compensation awards until two to four years following termination of employment in
order to discourage short-term risk taking); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker
Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for Risk Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1205, 1226-41 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1546229 (proposing
debt-based compensation to discourage short-term risk taking).
32.
GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 407-08.
33.
See Scarlett, supra note 7, at 57 (characterizing shareholder derivative
litigation as the "formal method of accountability in the corporate context").
34.
See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1059-62 (presenting an
empirical study demonstrating the rarity of out-of-pocket payments by outside
directors); Lynn A. Stout, On Proper Motives of CorporateDirectors (or, Why You Don't
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The business judgment rule offers 'directors an initial layer of
protection from personal liability. Under the business judgment rule,
courts refrain from second-guessing directors' decisions untainted by
self-dealing, illegality, waste, or fraud. 35 Thus, directors will not be
held to account for ill-advised decisions, so long as a rational basis for
the decision can be found.
In addition, special procedural rules that apply in derivative
litigation make it exceedingly difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on their
claims. The demand requirement mandates that plaintiffs first make
demand on the board to take corrective action or plead that such a
demand would be futile. 36 In cases where plaintiffs establish demand
futility, the board of directors can still wrest control of the litigation
by appointing a special litigation committee to assess the wisdom of
pursuing the claims. 37 Such committees typically conclude that
continuing the litigation is not in the corporation's interest and move to
dismiss the lawsuit on that basis. 38 In general, Delaware courts have
39
been deferential to the conclusions of the special litigation committee.
However, in several high-profile cases,, the courts rejected the special
committee's motion to dismiss, concluding that the committee members
40
were not sufficiently independent of the directors being sued.
The most significant barrier to director liability for oversight
failures are exculpatory provisions adopted in every state that

Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 7 (2003)
(arguing that corporate directors rarely have to pay damages in a breach of duty case).
35.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
36.
Id. at 814-15. To successfully plead demand futility, plaintiffs must allege
with particularity facts demonstrating that a majority of the directors had an interest
in the challenged transaction or that their decision is not otherwise protected by the
business judgment rule. If the court determines the plaintiffs have not properly pled
demand futility, their claims will be dismissed. Id.
37.
See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981) ("The
committee can properly act for the corporation to move to dismiss derivative litigation
that is believed to be detrimental to the corporation's best interest.").
38.
GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 434 ("Special litigation committees usually
have concluded that the derivative suits which the committees looked into were not in
the corporation's best interest." (citations omitted)); Jessica Erickson, Corporate
Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749,
1786 (2010) ("By and large, the SLCs in my study recommended dismissal of the
claims."); cf. Minor Myers, The Decisions of the Corporate Special Litigation
Committees: An Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1311 (2009) ("SLCs do not
uniformly decide to dismiss derivative litigation. They sought some form of formal
relief much more frequently than heretofore recognized: approximately forty percent of
the time, SLCs pursued or settled claims against one or more defendants.").
39.
GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 454-57 (describing Delaware courts' approach
to evaluating recommendations of special litigation committees).
40.
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 921 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(denying the special litigation committee's motion to terminate litigation for lack of
impartiality); Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148, 1165 (Del. Ch. 2003) (concluding that
the special litigation committee could not meet its burden to prove independence).
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immunize directors from liability for the breach of the duty of care. 41
In Delaware, for example, § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law allows corporations to eliminate directors' personal
liability for breach of fiduciary duty other than breach of the duty of
loyalty, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of law, improper
dividends, and acts and omissions "not in good faith. '42 Although the
interpretation of the term "good faith" has attracted significant
scholarly attention, recent Delaware cases make clear that liability
for oversight failures will not lie, absent a director's intentional
43
dereliction of duty.
Additional contractual arrangements further insulate directors
from any negative consequence of their oversight failures. Under
standard indemnification provisions, corporations pay all costs
associated with defending suits brought against directors in their
official capacity. 44 Any judgments and settlements that cannot
lawfully be indemnified can be covered by director and officer liability
policies purchased by the corporation. 45 Although indemnification
and insurance provisions limit payments in certain circumstances,
most cases are settled in a manner that ensures that such exclusions
46
are never triggered.

41.
See Anne Tucker Nees, Who's the Boss? Unmasking Oversight Liability
Within the Corporate Power Puzzle, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199, 218-19 (2010) (describing
the prevalence and operation of statutory exculpation provisions).
42.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). Section 102(b)(7) authorizes
inclusion in the corporate charter of:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary
duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit.the
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the
corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or
which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under
§ 174 of-this title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an
improper personal benefit.
Id.
43.
See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006) (stating that a
necessary condition for director oversight liability is "intentionally fail[ing] to act in the
face of a known duty to act").
44.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2011) ("A corporation shall have
power to indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a
party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding ...by reason
of the fact that the person is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the
corporation ....); see also Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1083-84
(noting that under Delaware law corporations may indemnify directors for damages,
settlements and legal expenses as long as the director acted in good faith).
45.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (allowing Delaware corporations to
purchase D&O insurance); Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1085 (noting
that almost all companies provide insurance for their officers and directors that cover
legal expenses, damages, and settlements).
46.
See TOM BAKER & SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT
49 (2010) (observing that the vast majority of shareholder claims settle without final
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Oversight Duties and Good Faith

Due to the prevalence of exculpatory provisions in corporate
charters, a director's failure to provide proper oversight will not
result in personal liability under Delaware law unless the plaintiff
can show that a director failed to act in good faith.4 7 Delaware courts'
interpretation of the term "good faith" has thus become the
determinative factor for the viability of an enforceable duty of
oversight. The phrase "good faith" is nowhere defined in the
Delaware's corporate statute and courts have struggled to impart
meaning to the term.
At one point, it appeared that a failure to act in good faith might
include conduct that could be classified as "especially" gross
negligence--conduct that was not a classic breach of the duty of
loyalty but was culpable enough to merit legal sanction. 48 Delaware
courts later clarified that they will not impose liability for
inattentiveness or gross negligence unless plaintiffs can prove "bad
49
faith" by showing that directors intentionally violated their duties.
Thus, under emerging good faith doctrine, even mechanistic efforts by
boards to review monitoring systems can create a virtually
impenetrable shield from liability, with little regard to the actual
effectiveness of such systems.
The Caremark line of cases demonstrates the courts' effort to
promote board oversight while at the same time declining to hold
directors personally accountable for lapses in oversight. 50 In re

adjudication and that plaintiffs craft pleadings to avoid allegations of intentional fraud
to avoid triggering policy exclusions).
47.
Section 102(b)(7) can be invoked as an affirmative defense at a motion to
dismiss. To survive the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must plead "with particularity"
facts showing that directors acted in bad faith-that they acted with intent to harm the
corporation or knowingly and intentionally breached their duties. See In re Citigroup
Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 135 (Del. Ch. 2009) (dismissing claims for
failure to sufficiently plead facts that could support a finding that the directors acted or
made material omissions in bad faith). Of course, it is not sufficient to simply plead
"the directors knew they were breaching their duties." Instead, the plaintiff must allege
facts that shed light on the directors' state of mind. This must be done without the
benefit of discovery, which might allow plaintiffs to unearth documents that reveal the
directors' state of mind or otherwise create a reasonable suspicion that the directors
acted in bad faith.
48.
See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric
in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 4-6 (2005) (noting that recent cases
treat good faith as an "independent basis for decision" rather than merely a shorthand
for duty of care); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith,89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 464
(2004) ("As a separate duty, good faith can attach to situations beyond those invoking
loyalty concerns .... ").
49.
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) ("[A] showing of bad
faith ... is essential to establish director oversight liability .... ).
See Jennifer Arlen, The Story of Allis-Chalmers, Caremark and Stone:
50.
Directors' Evolving Duty to Monitor, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 323, 339-42 (J. Mark
Ramseyer ed., 2009) (describing Chancellor William Allen's hope that, despite the
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Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation 51 presents the
modern formulation of a director's oversight duties by rejecting as
outdated the Delaware Supreme Court's earlier pronouncement in
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers.5 2 In Caremark, the court asserted that
directors have a duty to ensure that a monitoring system exists that
is capable of providing directors with "timely, accurate information
sufficient to allow management and the board, each within its scope,
to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation's
53
compliance with law and its business performance."
Caremark's assertion of the existence of a duty to monitor was
mere dicta, as the judge was considering a motion to approve a
settlement. While touting the importance of director oversight duties,
the court concluded that no breach of duty had likely occurred, as the
board had adopted a compliance program that nonetheless failed to
prevent the legal violations. 54 Indeed, the directors were aware of the
conduct that was the basis for federal sanctions. However, Chancellor
Allen concluded that, because lawyers had advised the board that the
practices in question were "contestable, [but] lawful," the board had
55
likely fulfilled its duty to monitor.
Under Caremark, a board's failure to create a monitoring system
would constitute a breach of the duty of care, and as an unconsidered
56
failure to act, would not be protected by the business judgment rule.
However, Caremark also provides that once a monitoring system is in
place, the board's decisions as to the scope and adequacy of the
system are business decisions that lie beyond judicial scrutiny, save
for certain exceptions to the business judgment rule. 57 Thus, under
Caremark, once a corporation has put a compliance system in place,
courts will not hold directors responsible for damages even if the
monitoring system fails. 5 8 Although Caremark was framed as a duty
of care decision, the court invoked good faith as the standard by
which to assess the board's process in adopting the monitoring

narrow standard of review it endorsed, his Caremark opinion "would alter directors'
behavior through its moral suasion and associated impact on directors' norms").
51.
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
52.
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (holding
that directors had no duty to "ferret out wrongdoing" and would not be liable for a
corporation's violation of law unless they knew or should have known about the
violations).
53.
Caremark,698 A.2d at 970.
54.
Id. at 971-72.
55.
Id. at 971.
56.
Id. at 968-70.
57.
Id. at 970.
58.
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370-73 (Del. 2006) (indicating that as
long as the reporting system is reasonable, a board will not have to monitor every
decision by its officers); Caremark,698 A.2d at 970 (acknowledging that even good faith
information and reporting systems sometimes will fail to reveal problems).
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system.5 9 Because a director's "acts or omissions not in good faith" are
beyond the protection of an exculpatory provision, Caremark allowed
for a theoretical risk of personal liability.
Years after the Caremark ruling, a series of decisions in the
Disney litigation created uncertainty regarding whether a director's
gross inattention to business matters could result in personal liability
as a failure to act in good faith. 60 In 2003, the Delaware Chancery
Court surprised observers when it denied a motion to dismiss a claim
against Disney's directors for approving Disney president Michael
Ovitz's employment agreement with its lucrative termination
provisions.6 1 The court concluded that the plaintiffs adequately pled
that the directors failed to act in good faith by alleging that they paid
insufficient attention to an important business matter, "adopting a
'we don't care about the risks' attitude concerning a material
62
corporate decision."
The 2003 Disney decision caused a stir, as the legal community
had long presumed that § 102(b)(7) protected directors from personal
liability for any lapses other than the breach of the duty of loyalty. In
Stone v. Ritter however, the Delaware Supreme Court quelled any
lingering fears among directors that the Disney decisions had raised.
In Stone, the court announced that the duty to act in good faith was
not an independent duty, but was instead a subset of the duty of
loyalty. 63 The court ruled that oversight failures that amounted to the
breach of the duty of good faith were nonexculpable breaches of the
duty of loyalty.6 4 However, the court also reiterated Caremark's
admonition that it would be extremely difficult for plaintiffs to
65
succeed on such a claim.
Thus under Stone, to prevail on an oversight claim, plaintiffs
must show that directors failed to act in the face of a known duty to
act, by demonstrating the board's "utter failure" to implement a
monitoring and reporting system or a conscious failure to monitor or
oversee the operation of such a system.6 6 As put succinctly in Stone,
plaintiffs must show not only that oversight failures led to corporate

59.
See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970 (emphasizing a director's obligation to
"exercise a good faith judgment" that the corporation's information and reporting
system is adequate).
60.
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693
(Del. Ch. 2005); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
61.
Disney, 825 A.2d at 275.
62.
Id. at 289.
63.
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
64.
Id.
65.
See id. at 372 (noting with approval the description of an oversight claim in
Caremark as "possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a
plaintiff might hope to win a judgment"); Pan, supra note 29, at 232-33 (describing the
practical difficulties of successfully arguing a failure to monitor claim).
66.
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370.
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losses, but that the directors knew that they were breaching their
duties and simply did not care. 6 7 Despite arguably raising the bar for
pleading a duty to monitor claim, the Delaware courts have offered
little guidance as to how plaintiffs might successfully plead the
68
required facts regarding the directors' state of mind.
The Court of Chancery's more recent decision in In re Citigroup
Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation underscores the challenges
69
plaintiffs face in seeking to recover for directors' oversight failures.
In Citigroup, the plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup's directors failed to
adequately monitor financial risks that brought the company to the
brink of collapse. 70 The Court of Chancery dismissed the claim,
concluding that because Citigroup had established an audit and risk
management committee that met multiple times per year and was
charged with monitoring corporate risk, the plaintiffs' oversight claim
must fail. 71 The court declined to inquire as to whether the committee
did anything useful, or whether despite the monitoring system,
enough facts had come to the directors' attention to alert them that
risk management policies needed to be adjusted. 72 Instead, the court
concluded that despite the ostensible duty of oversight, Citigroup's
directors were not responsible for the company's spectacular
73
collapse.
C. The Economic Consequences of Oversight Failures
The need for an effective accountability mechanism for oversight
responsibilities becomes stark when one considers the serious
consequences that often flow from oversight failures. Many would
argue that Citigroup's near collapse is an instance in which the
absence of effective oversight led to catastrophic consequences for the
74
firm, its investors, and the nation.
As one of the world's largest financial conglomerates, Citigroup
was highly profitable during the early and mid-2000s, reporting
profits of about $24 billion and $21 billion in 2005 and 2006

67.
See id. ("[I]mposition of liability requires a showing that the directors knew
that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations.").
Pan, supra note 29, at 211.
68.
In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
69.
Id. at 111-12.
70.
71.
See id. at 128.
See Bainbridge, supra note 29, at 986 (describing the demands imposed on
72.
the board in Citigroup as "strikingly modest" and noting that "[t]he court did not drill
down into the details of what the audit committee actually did with respect to risk
management").
73.
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 131 ("Oversight duties under Delaware law are not
designed to subject directors, even expert directors, to personal liability for failure to
predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.").
GEVURTZ, supra note 22, at 236-37 (noting the financial bailouts as an
74.
example of the societal impact of corporate failures).
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respectively. 75 Its apparent success began to unravel in October 2007
when it suddenly announced the write-down of $5.9 billion in
assets. 76 Within a year, losses had mounted to more than $65 billion,
half of which were attributed to investments in mortgage-backed
securities. 77 In the fall of 2008, Citigroup became the fourth major
78
financial firm to require government rescue.
A surfeit of evidence unearthed by journalists and government
investigators suggests that Citigroup's directors and senior managers
actively encouraged a high-risk strategy that included massive
investments in subprime assets, including collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). 79 After urging this embrace of risk, the directors

75.
CITIGROUP ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at
1 (2006),
available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/finldata/ar06c-en.pdf?ieNocache=702.
76.
Eric Dash, Banks Admit Loan Losses; Stocks Rally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2007, at Al.
77.
Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 23, 2008, at Al. Other Wall Street firms experienced similar problems as the
subprime mortgage market continued to falter. Merrill Lynch wrote off $8.4 billion in
late October 2007 and fired its CEO, Stanley O'Neal. Eric Dash, The Price of Any
DepartureWill Be at Least $159 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at A12. In March
2008, Bear Stearns was sold in a fire sale to JP Morgan Chase. Jenny Anderson,
Aftershocks of a Collapse, with a Bank at the Epicenter, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, at
Cl. Mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were taken over by the government
in September 2008, and other major banks, including Washington Mutual and
IndyMac, failed or were rescued during the period. The crisis finally came to a head in
September 2008 when Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy and Merrill Lynch was
rescued by Bank of America's acquisition. Eric Dash, 5 Days of Pressure, Fear and
Ultimately, Failure,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at Al; Eric Dash, Purchase of Merrill
Fulfills Quest for a Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A18; Louise Story, Regulators
Seize IndyMac After a Run on the Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2008, at C5; Eric Dash &
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2008 at Al.
On September 18, after rescuing insurance giant AIG, Treasury Secretary Henry
Paulson asked Congress for authority to spend up to $700 billion to purchase toxic
assets from weakened financial firms. Congress passed the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act (known informally as Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP) on
October 3, 2008. Mark Landler & Edmund L. Andrews, For Treasury Department, Now
Comes Hard Part of Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al. On October 13, Citigroup
received $25 billion in initial TARP funds. However, by November, the firm was still
struggling, leading to a second round of TARP assistance in the form of a $20 billion
preferred stock purchase along with a federal guarantee of $306 billion of assets on the
firm's balance sheet. David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
78.
Eric Dash, U.S. Approves Plan to Help Citigroup Weather Losses, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 24, 2008, at Al.
79.
Dash & Creswell, supra note 77, at Al. Citigroup had embarked on this
high-octane strategy at the urging of Robert Rubin, chairman of the executive
committee of the board of directors, who counseled CEO Charles Prince to embrace risk
to enable the firm to match the performance of competitors such as Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley. Id.
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80
failed to adequately monitor the implementation of the strategy.
Further, contemporaneous reports from regulators and public and
private lawsuits had exposed serious weaknesses in Citigroup's risk
management practices, internal controls, and ethical standards.8 1 For
example, in 2005 the Federal Reserve imposed a moratorium on
additional acquisitions by Citigroup due to prolonged concerns about
82
internal control weaknesses and poor risk management at the firm.
Likewise, the Office of Comptroller of the Currency repeatedly
expressed concerns over Citigroup's lax risk management. 83 In
addition, from 2001 through 2005, Citigroup paid billions of dollars to
settle regulatory and private actions that highlighted management
and ethical problems, including participation in the Enron 8 frauds,
4
financial analyst fraud, mortgage origination fraud, and more.
Compounding the board's monitoring lapses, Citigroup's
directors failed to react as evidence of weakness in real estate and
subprime came to the fore. Instead, the firm continued its high-risk
strategy focused on CDOs and securitizations, and in fact moved to
enhance its exposure in that sector. 8 5 As the real estate market
softened, Citigroup ramped up its subprime mortgage operations,
churning out mortgage backed securities and CDOs without properly
monitoring its exposure. 8 6 Reportedly, CEO Charles Prince did not
become aware of the full extent of the firm's subprime exposure until
September 2007 when it was too late for the firm to recover.87
These kinds of observations formed the gravamen of the
plaintiffs' complaint in Citigroup, which the chancery court gave
short shrift. Because Citigroup had established an audit and risk
management committee, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could
not demonstrate the "utter failure" to implement a monitoring system
that Caremark and Stone require. 8 As to Caremark's second prong of
failing to heed red flags, the plaintiffs' efforts also faltered. 89

80.
See THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N [FCIC], THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT 137-39 (2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf
(showing that the Citigroup CDO group did not adequately assess risk).
81.
For example, Citigroup paid $2.65 billion to settle investor securities fraud
claims in connection with the WorldCom failure. It also paid $2 billion to settle Enron
investors' claims. In addition, the firm paid $400 million to settle federal and state
claims in connection with analyst fraud and to settle regulators' mortgage fraud claims.
See id. at 59-60, 137.
82.
Id. at 137; see also Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 118-19 (stating that the
failure Citigroup's internal risk controls contributed to the company's downfall).
83.
FCIC, supra note 80, at 137, 198-99.
84.
Id. at 60, 92, 137.
85.
Id. at 195-99; Gevurtz, supra note 29, at 118-19.
86.
Dash & Creswell, supranote 77, at Al.
87.
Id.
88.
In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 137 (Del. Ch.
2009).
Id. at 115, 124.
89.
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Although the plaintiffs pointed to a nu.lAber of events and reports
that should have alerted directors to looming problems, the court
rejected their claim. Instead, the court concluded that the red flags
cited were too broad and exogenous to Citigroup to put the board on
notice of problems occurring at the firm. 90
The court's analysis in Citigroup glosses over the fact that
corporate law and best practice standards require directors to pay
attention to corporate affairs and industry trends in addition to
understanding the company's financial statements. 9 1 Thus, legitimate
questions linger regarding Citigroup's directors' failure to respond to
alarming news of softness in the real estate market, mounting
mortgage losses at other banks, and the rapid deterioration in the
value of its subprime assets. 92 An additional concern is whether the
directors were aware of the scope of Citigroup's subprime exposure,
and if not, why not. Such questions go to the heart of directors'
oversight responsibilities, but the Delaware court spared the directors
of any requirement to address these questions when it dismissed
93
plaintiffs' claims.

90.
Id. at 128 ('The 'red flags' in the complaint amount to little more than
portions of public documents that reflected the worsening conditions in the subprime
mortgage market and in the economy generally.").
91.
See Hoye v. Meek, 795 F.2d 893, 896-97 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a director
liable for breach of the duty of care for failing to monitor investment decisions,
delegating too much authority, and failing to respond to the company's increasing
exposure to risk); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (N.J. 1981)
(holding that a director's obligations include "reading and understanding financial
statements, and making reasonable attempts at detection and prevention of the illegal
conduct of other officers and directors").
92.
It is especially telling that soon after the cataclysmic events of 2007,
Citigroup began to search for new directors with "expertise in finance and
investments." Citigroup Director Search, CITIGROUP INC., http://www.citigroup.com/citi/
corporategovernance/directorsearch.htm. (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
93.
A federal court assessing the culpability of Citigroup officials for financial
disclosure violations reached different conclusions regarding certain Citigroup officials'
responsibility for investors' losses. In In re Citigroup Inc. Securities Litigation, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the District Court for the Southern District of New York
allowed several securities fraud claims against Citigroup and certain of its directors
and officers to proceed. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had pled facts adequate
to create a strong inference that directors Charles Prince and Robert Rubin acted with
scienter in failing to disclose the extent of the company's subprime risk exposure. Id. at
237-38. Although Charles Prince was an insider, as a nonexecutive chairman, Robert
Rubin was considered an outside director of Citigroup. Id. at 239.
The issues in the Citigroupsecurities litigation differed from the matter before the
court in Delaware. However, in common was the question of scienter-defendants'
knowledge with respect to material facts. In contrast to the Delaware decision, the
federal district court concluded that plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to create a
"strong inference" that the Citigroup defendants knew of the extent of Citigroup's
subprime risks yet failed to disclose those risks to investors. In re Citigroup, 753 F.
Supp. 2d at 237.
Similarly, in In re Countrywide FinancialCorp. Derivative Litigation, 554 F. Supp.
2d 1044 (C.D. Cal. 2008), a district court in California excused demand for state-based
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The point is not to argue that Citigroup's directors breached
their oversight duties and should be held liable for their failures, but
rather that by dismissing the complaint, the Delaware Chancery
Court precluded reaching a conclusion on the matter. The dismissal
on procedural grounds spared directors of the need to explain or
justify their actions or inaction. Because of Delaware's hands-off
approach to oversight liability, cases like Citigroup are rarely
adjudicated and corporate directors are deprived of meaningful
94
guidance about what their duties entail.

III.

ASSESSING DEFENSES OF THE LAX DIRECTOR LIABILITY REGIME

A. Common Defenses of Delaware'sLax Liability Regime
Many corporate scholars have expressed concern about the
absence of personal accountability in the U.S. corporate governance
regime. Professor Geoffrey Miller recently labeled Delaware's
fiduciary duty of care "broken" and called for judicial reforms that
would provide more meaningful guidance to directors regarding their
duties. 95 Similarly, Professor Donald Langevoort has lamented the
fact that corporate executives rarely contribute personally to
shareholder settlements despite the large fortunes they often amass
at the corporate helm. 96 Other scholars have raised similar concerns,
calling both for increased clarity from courts on the contours of
directors' duties and a willingness to impose liability in appropriate
97
cases.

oversight claims against Countrywide directors, in which plaintiffs alleged the
directors failed to monitor the bank's exposure to the subprime market and failed to
respond to the sustained derogation of mortgage underwriting standards at the bank.
For a further discussion of the Countrywide decision, see Pan, supra note 29, at 23537.
94.
See Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Fixing Delaware's Broken
Duty of Care, 2010 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 319, 329 (2010) (arguing that the lack of
"realistic" opportunities for attorneys' fees and the likelihood of settlement prevents
judges from offering opinions about the quality of management's decision-making
processes, and there are, consequently, few cases and very little commentary).
95.
See Miller, supra note 94, at 320 ("Delaware's duty of care is broken.
Although the state purports to police against gross negligence by corporate directors, it
does nothing of the sort ....Worse, the fantasy that Delaware monitors director
performance creates an unhealthy misconception that someone is minding the store.").
96.
Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving CorporateExecutives "Naked, Homeless
and Without Wheels" CorporateFraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity
Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (arguing that
executives responsible for corporate fraud should forfeit the wealth they obtained "as a
result of their control over the firm during the time of the wrongdoing").
97.
See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Normative Justificationsfor Lax (or
No) Corporate Fiduciary Duties: A Tale of ProblematicPrinciples,Imagined Facts and
Inefficient Outcomes, 99 KY. L.J. 231, 233 (2010) (arguing for a robust fiduciary
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Although some scholars have criticized Delaware's "good faith"
jurisprudence, 98 the dominant position among U.S. corporate scholars
is to defend the Delaware approach. Professors Brian Cheffins and
Bernard Black provide an apt statement of the position:
[W]e suggest that the existing pattern of [minimal] liability risk could
reflect sensible public policy. Reputational concerns can motivate
outside directors to be vigilant even when they have little fear of ending
up out of pocket in a lawsuit. Moreover, substantial liability risk could
have negative corporate governance consequences. Capable people,
fearing financial ruin, might decline directorships; boards could spend
too much time on the wrong things; and boardroom decision-making
99
could become counterproductively cautious.

Professors Cheffins and Black's assertions echo a common refrain
often repeated to defend Delaware's lax approach to enforcing
fiduciary duties. Examples of such reasoning are evident in
Chancellor Allen's landmark Caremark decision. In Caremark,
Chancellor Allen asserted that there are "good policy reasons why it
is so difficult to charge directors with responsibility for corporate
losses for an alleged breach of care, where there is no conflict of
interest or no facts suggesting suspect motivation involved."' 10 0 A
more vigorous director liability regime, he claimed, would harm
shareholders because "directors will tend to deviate from [the]
rational acceptance of corporate risk if in authorizing the corporation
to undertake a risky investment, the directors must assume some
degree of personal risk relating to ex post facto claims of derivative
liability for any resulting corporate loss."101
Other corporate scholars maintain that liability for breach of the
duty of care is unnecessary because extralegal forces such as social
norms provide adequate constraints on board misconduct.' 0 2 Such

standard for corporate managers); Lisa A. Fairfax, Spare the Rod and Spoil the
Director?Revitalizing Directors Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L.
REV. 393, 395 (2005) ("Legal liability represents an essential mechanism for ensuring
directors' fidelity to their fiduciary duties."); Jones, supra note 5, at 145-46 (calling on
judges to impose penalties for breaches of fiduciary duty in appropriate cases);
Elizabeth A. Nowicki, Director Inattention and Director Protection under Delaware
General Corporation Law Section 102(b)(7): A Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 33 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 695, 697 (2008) (asserting that "the threat of punishment via personal
liability exposure" has potential to be a powerful tool to combat director inattention).
See Nees, supra note 41, at 204-206 (criticizing Delaware doctrine on
98.
oversight liability); Pan, supranote 29, at 211 (same).
99.
Cheffins & Black, supranote 11, at 1389.
100.
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
101.
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
These arguments can be traced back to the so-called New Chicago School.
102.
Members of the New Chicago School sought to identify mechanisms that would allow
the government to exploit the power of norms to elicit or reinforce desirable social
conduct. They reasoned that if one could employ laws to manipulate social norms, there
would be less need for direct legal commands or state imposed sanctions. E.g., Jones,
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scholars insist that we need not worry that fiduciary duties lack
formal methods of enforcement, because the conduct of corporate
officials can be appropriately constrained by social norms. 10 3 These
theorists focus on two mechanisms by which a permissive corporate
law regime might still motivate desirable director conduct. First,
some speculate that when judges articulate aspirational standards
even while declining to impose penalties for a breach, they appeal to
directors' internal motivations to be "good directors." 10 4 These wellintentioned directors will be influenced by judicial pronouncements
regarding suboptimal director conduct even when no legal
05
consequences flow from failures in corporate oversight.
Similarly, some commentators suggest that judges can shame
directors when they criticize their conduct in opinions that ultimately
conclude no breach of duty occurred. 106 For example, Professor
Edward Rock has argued,
A system that relies on public shaming is perfectly suited to [the
corporate] context[ ]: The cost to the actor-the disdain in the eyes of
one's acquaintances, the loss of directorships, the harm to one's
reputation-may often be sufficiently great to deter behavior, even
107
without anything more.

This shame is thought to come from reading judges' caustic language
knowing it may be reprinted in the Wall Street Journal or
memorialized in corporate law casebooks and Lexis and Westlaw

supra note 5, at 121-23. For a broader summary and critique of corporate law and
norms theories, see id. at 125-44.
103.
See, e.g., Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 12 ("If near-zero
liability risk is optimal, it is in substantial part because other sources of incentives
already do much to motivate outside directors to do a good job."); Margaret M. Blair &
Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1796-97 (2001) (arguing that directors will usually heed
fiduciary duties despite the lack of legal incentives to do so); Rock & Wachter, supra
note 2, at 1670-71 (asserting that corporate governance "works much better" when the
duty of care is a non-legally-enforceable rule).
104.
Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law
Work?, 44 UCLAL. REV. 1009, 1103-04 (1997).
105.
The Delaware Chancery Court's trial opinion in the Disney litigation
provides an example of this reasoning. Despite exonerating all of the defendants,
Chancellor Chandler, and many contemporary commentators, invoked norms-based
arguments to explain the decision's potential impact. See In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff'd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)
("[T]he Opinion may serve as guidance for future officers and directors-not only of The
Walt Disney Company, but of other Delaware corporations."); Sandeep Gopalan, Shame
Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 757, 767 (2007) (suggesting that
cases like Disney may make directors more conscious of their responsibilities even
though the case did not hold the director liable); Martha Neil, Disney Case Has No
Storybook Ending, 4 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, no. 35, 2005, at 5 (stating that the Disney
decision will lead directors to pay more attention to their duties).
106.
Rock, supra note 104, at 1103; David A. Skeel, Shaming in Corporate Law,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1823-26 (2001).
107.
Rock, supra note 104, at 1104.
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databases. 108 There is scant evidence that such shaming actually
influences director conduct. In fact, the major corporate failures that
have characterized the past decade suggest otherwise. Yet to some,
the very possibility that this may occur helps to justify a lax director
liability regime.10 9
B. Law Compliance Literature
Norms governance claims figure prominently in the standard
defenses for lax liability standards in corporate law. Yet, studies on
the factors that motivate law compliance raise doubts as to whether
norms alone, without support from law, are sufficient to motivate
optimal levels of compliance. In 2001, Soren Winter and Peter May
reviewed many of these studies and concluded that the factors
motivating compliance fall into three broad categories: normative
factors, social factors, and calculated factors. 110
In their framework, a normative motivation toward compliance
stems from an individual's "internalized values or moral
reasoning,""' and an acceptance of the legitimacy and importance of
the law. 112 An individual's general moral principles or sense of civic
duty contribute to a normative willingness to comply with a given
requirement. 113 So too does the individual's evaluation of the value of
114
a given rule or regulation.
External social factors motivating compliance stem from a desire
to be respected and approved of by others.1 5 The desire to avoid
negative publicity associated with an enforcement action 116 and the
consequential shame, guilt, 11 7 and disapproval 18 are important social

108.
Id. at 1103; see also Jonathan A. Macey, Delaware: Home of the -World's
Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2005) (noting that directors
"do not like to be made the object of public scorn and ridicule").
109.
Macey, supra note 109, at 1134.
110.
Soren C. Winter & Peter J. May, Motivation for Compliance. with,.
EnvironmentalRegulations, J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 675, 675 (2001).
111.
Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created
Equal?,84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 993 (2009).
112.
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 25-26 (1990) (discussing the
role of legitimacy in motivating law compliance); Winter & May, supra note 110, 'a
677.
113.
Winter & May, supra note 110, at 677.
114.
Id. at 678.
115.
Id.
116.
See Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, How Much Thoes It Hurt?
How Australian Businesses Think About the Costs and Gains of Compliance and
Noncompliance with the Trade Practices Act, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 554, 593-94 (2008)
(demonstrating that the greater the perceived risk of being caught innoncompliance by
third parties, the higher respondents perceive both the costs and gains of compliance to
be).
117.
Feldman & Teichman, supra note 111, at 994.
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factors motivating compliance. 119 Social factors differ from normative
factors in that those motivated by social factors comply in order to
gain approval, even when they do not have an internalized
commitment to the particular requirement. 120 However, over time
those motivated by social factors may internalize these values and
1
become normatively committed to compliance.12
Calculated factors include the costs of compliance, likelihood of
detection, and likely penalties. According to classic deterrence theory,
the likelihood that an actor will comply with a rule can be determined
by the expected utility of compliance versus noncompliance. 122
Central to the calculation of the cost and benefits of noncompliance is
the role of enforcement and deterrence. As Winter and May argue,
the cost-benefit "calculus is affected by likelihood of detection-and
by the speed, certainty, and size of the sanction imposed. As such, the
enforcement regime is, theoretically at least, an important component
1 23
of calculations of expected utility."'
The Winter and May framework helps to contextualize the norms
governance hypothesis, which maintains that market and social
sanctions are sufficient to deter misconduct and breach of duty by
corporate officials. The norms governance hypothesis emphasizes the
force of normative and social factors, but fails to take account of the
influence of calculated factors. It therefore oversimplifies the
relationship between law, norms, and the conduct of directors.
There are two principal reasons why the norms governance
hypothesis falls short. First, it fails to take into account that the way
persons motivated by normative and social factors perceive the law is
influenced by the vigor with which the law is enforced. Secondly, the
norms governance hypothesis does not adequately address how to
manage those directors who are primarily motivated by calculated
factors, in the absence of a realistic threat of formal sanctions.

118.

John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of

CorporateDeterrence, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 7, 8 (1991).

119.
Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, To What Extent Do Third
Parties Influence Business Compliance?, 35 J.L. & SOC'Y 309, 329 (2008). A study of
attitudes toward compliance with Australian Trade Practices Law conducted by Parker
and Nielsen found that Australian businesses are concerned about how any
noncompliance may be viewed by various third parties including customers,
shareholders, employees, and business partners. Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen, What Do Australian Businesses Really Think of the ACCC, and Does It
Matter?, 35 FED. L. REV. 187 (2007) (Austl.). While not statistically significant, the
authors did find some evidence that these concerns may have some positive impact on
some aspects of compliance. Id. at 234.
120.
Winter & May, supra note 110, at 678.
121.

Id.

122.
123.

Id. at 676.
Id.

368

1.

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45:343

Flaws in the Norms Governance Hypothesis for Those Motivated
by Normative and Social Factors

As one of us has previously argued, the disciplinary power of
norms alone cannot adequately regulate the behavior of corporate
officials. 124 A normative motivation toward compliance stems from an
125 and an
individual's "internalized values or moral reasoning"
126
acceptance of the legitimacy and importance of the law.
Perceptions of the law's legitimacy and import are shaped in part
by enforcement practices. An individual's understanding of his or her
moral obligations will be influenced by both the vigor with which the
127
If
law is enforced, and the severity of sanctions that are imposed.
will
observers
negligible,
are
or
penalties
enforced
is
not
the law
likely conclude that the standard does not really matter, and the
from either a
failure to satisfy the standard becomes unproblematic
28
moral perspective or out of concern for reputation.
Despite the important social message that enforcement policies
convey, law and norms scholars maintain that the desire to avoid
negative emotions or bad publicity associated with a corporate failure
or disastrous decision can help motivate corporate officials to attend
diligently to their duties, even though a breach will not likely result
in formal sanctions. 29 This argument overlooks the reality that the
impact of social factors will wane in situations where enforcement
practices are lax, or where penalties for breach of duty are minimal.
Thus, the risk exists that without external accountability
mechanisms, certain undesirable conduct will become more
commonplace and therefore more widely tolerated. In this way,
acceptable norms of board conduct may be replaced over time with
1 30
unacceptable norms.

124.
Jones, supra note 5, at 127.
Feldman & Teichman, supranote 111, at 993.
125.
Winter and May, supra note 110, at 677.
126.
Jones, supra note 5, at 130.
127.
See Fairfax, supra note 97, at 428-32 (noting the failure of reputational
128.
concerns to appropriately motivate Enron's directors); Miller, supra note 94, at 328-29
(noting the failure of Delaware's judicial decisions to deliver clear moral messages).
See supra text accompanying notes 102-09.
129.
Examples include mutual fund market timing, options backdating,
130.
subprime lending abuses, and other forms of fraud that directors and corporate officers
readily overlooked, which soon became common practices in the affected industries. See
Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities
Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 108, 117-19 (2004).
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Flaws in the Norms Governance Hypothesis for Those Motivated
by Calculated Factors

Even if normative and social factors do carry the disciplinary
force that its proponents ascribe to them, not every corporate actor
will be sufficiently motivated by normative and social factors. Some
corporate actors are influenced more by calculated factors, and will
disregard legal standards when the benefits of noncompliance
outweigh the perceived costs. The norms governance hypothesis fails
to grapple adequately with the problem of the recalcitrant actor.
For corporate officers and directors, the benefits of lax oversight
may include the relatively minor benefit of the time saved as a
consequence of inaction. For some directors passivity and silence may
be the perceived price for maintaining one's board position and its
attendant benefits. Other perceived benefits of lax monitoring may
include financial and other benefits that flow to the corporations and
indirectly to individual officers and directors as a result of a failure to
comply with legal or regulatory requirements. In reality, even a
minor benefit may be enough to induce noncompliance if the
perceived costs of noncompliance are sufficiently low.
A functioning accountability system matters most for those who
are motivated principally by calculated factors. For a person
motivated by calculated factors, increasing the likelihood of
enforcement can increase one's commitment to compliance. 131 A
pessimistic view of human nature lies at the center of deterrent-based
strategies. 132 Deterrence based strategies rely on the availability of
some mechanism to hold responsible the person or corporation
engaged in misconduct.
3.

Multiple Motivating Factors

Recent scholarship on law compliance suggests that it
oversimplifies matters to assume that a single motivating factor can
be ascribed to any individual. 133 Instead, such scholarship suggests
that it is most likely that each person is motivated by multiple factors
to comply with their duties, and that various motivations come to the
forefront at different points in time. As Winter and May observe,
while calculated, normative, and social motivating factors are
sometimes presented as competing bases of compliance, the three are
134
not mutually exclusive.

131.
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) (presenting the deterrence perspective on law compliance).
132.

SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL CONTROL 94 (2002).

133.
134.

See supra text accompanying notes 110-23.
Winter & May, supra note 110, at 676.
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Other commentators have concluded that the factors motivating
compliance will vary for different people, and further note that an
individual's motivations may shift over time. For example, John
Braithwaite and Ian Ayres assert that corporate actors will be
motivated to comply with laws and regulatory requirements by a
range of factors. 135 In their view, some corporate actors may be driven
to act by a sense of social responsibility or a commitment to ethical
13 6
behavior, whereas others will be driven purely by economic factors.
Some will be induced to act by a combination of these and other
factors. 137 In addition, the factors driving the behavior of individuals
may change over time. 138 The norms governance hypothesis ignores
this dynamic.
C. Toward an Ideal Enforcement Regime
Literature on law compliance demonstrates that regulators
benefit from having a range of tools to address individuals and
corporations that are motivated by different factors for compliance.139
The lesson of these studies is that a successful regulatory regime
should have at its disposal mechanisms that allow virtuous actors the
chance to be virtuous and to comply voluntarily with the law. Ideally,
an effective legal system would marshal the forces of normative and
social factors to induce compliance with the law in the absence of
detection. Indeed, society could not function if most citizens did not
voluntarily comply with the law most of the time. However, a
successful regime must also include mechanisms to penalize
violations of the law in order to entice nonresponsive actors to
comply.140

See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
135.
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (arguing under responsive

regulation theory that a regulatory agency will not able to detect and enforce every
contravention of the law it administers and therefore must have mechanisms at its
disposal that it can utilize to encourage regulated persons to comply with the law);
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY

(1985) (same); George Gilligan et al., Civil Penalties and the Enforcement of Directors'
Duties, 22 U.N.S.W. L.J. 417, 426 (1999) (arguing responsive regulation theory
encourages regulators to utilize the enforcement regimes at their disposal in such a
way as to "stimulate maximum levels of regulatory compliance").
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 135, at 24.
136.
Id.
137.
138.
Id.
See, e.g., Parker & Nielsen, supra note 119, at 195 ("[Rlesponsive
139.
regulation, responds to the plurality and complexity of the motivations and contextual
factors that influence compliant and non-compliant behavior by saying that regulators
should also use multiple enforcement strategies in contextually sensitive ways.").
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 135, at 26. Responsive regulation theory
140.
has been applied in many contexts. See FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION:
BEYOND "PUNISH OR PERSUADE" (1997) (applying theory to an analysis of corporate
response to deaths at work); Darryl Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime and the
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In the absence of concrete consequences for the failure to adhere
to a legal standard, the standard loses force as a guide for behavior
for those motivated by normative, social, and calculated factors. As
the recent corporate debacles suggest, aspirational standards have
failed to guide directors of many prominent corporations to act as
vigilant overseers of corporate operations. 141 The lax liability regime
has not in fact induced the responsible conduct that its proponents
asserted it would. 142 It thus appears that the prolonged failure by
courts to enforce fiduciary standards has contributed to an erosion of
conduct standards across the corporate landscape.
In Australia, courts have been called upon to evaluate the
conduct of directors of corporations that failed or became embroiled in
scandal. The Australian courts evaluate director conduct under an
objective standard. 143 As a result, prominent directors of several
public corporations in Australia have faced significant civil
sanctions. 144 Yet, contrary to the fears of many U.S. commentators,
the higher standard of conduct has neither led to a rash of director

Contingency of Criminal Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295 (2001) (applying theory to
criminal liability); Todd Lochner & Bruce Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement
of Campaign FinanceLaws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891 (1999) (applying theory to campaign
finance reform); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance, Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A
Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 445, 452 (1993) (arguing
that procedural justice, fairness, or legitimacy of experienced punishment is essential
to the acknowledgment of shame, which conditions deterrence).
141.
As with investigative reports into the Enron and WorldCom failures,
several investigations into the causes of the 2008 financial crisis have concluded that
the directors, and to some extent, senior managers of failed firms were unaware of the
extent of risk the firms had incurred, and the firms' failures to fully disclose these
risks. For accounts of firms involved in the financial crisis, see In re Citigroup Inc. Sec.
Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In
re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555), available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/lehmanvol2.pdf; FCIC, supra note 80,
at xii. For thorough accounts of the WorldCom and Enron failures, respectively, see
RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF: THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. (2003), available at
http://law.du.edu/images/uploads/restoring-trust.pdf; SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMM. OF
THE BD. OF DIRS. OF ENRON CORP., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION (2002), available at
http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2002LAW/O2/O2/enron.report/powers.report.pdf.
142.
FCIC, supra note 80, at xxvii-xxviii ("[W]e found dramatic breakdowns of
corporate governance, profound lapses in regulatory oversight, and near fatal flaws in
our financial system."). For partial disavowals by former advocates of market
regulation, see, for example, The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, 110th Cong. 18 (2008)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Former Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd.) (noting that the
market, alone, cannot provide adequate incentives to protect shareholders); Stephen
Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008,
at Al (quoting former SEC Chairman Christopher Cox as noting "[t]he last six months
have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work").
143.
CorporationsAct 2001 (Cth) s 180(1) (Austl.).
144.
For a thorough discussion of judicial review of director conduct in
Australia, see infra Part IV.C.
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resignations, nor resulted in any discernible negative impact on the
145
Australian economy.
Through public enforcement of corporate law, Australia has
overcome many of the standard objections voiced in the United States
to more vigorous enforcement of directors' duties. The concern with
discouraging strike suits fades under a public enforcement regime.
Similarly, judicial hesitation to impose draconian penalties is
dampened because penalties can be calibrated based on the
culpability of the defendants. With public enforcement, regulators can
bring actions in the public interest even absent the prospect of a big
payoff for lawyers. Finally, public enforcement offers mechanisms
that can protect investors and the public from future harms that may
be visited by unfit or inattentive directors, as regulators are able to
obtain orders disqualifying directors from managing public companies
upon proof of a breach of the duty of care.

IV. PUBLIC

ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS' DUTIES IN AUSTRALIA

The Australian approach to enforcing directors' duties differs
significantly from U.S. practice. It has long been accepted in
Australia that it is appropriate to provide a range of enforcement
mechanisms for the duties of directors. Australian directors who
breach their duties may be subject to public enforcement by ASIC in
addition to private civil enforcement. The Australian statutory
regime allows ASIC to seek a range of orders including pecuniary
penalties and officer and directors bans. In recent years, ASIC has
obtained significant orders against directors of several high-profile
companies.
A. The Development of Australia's CorporateLaw Regime
Australian corporate law is governed by the 2001 Australian
Corporations Act (the Corporations Act). 146 ASIC, the national

145.
See infra Part IV.C.2 (evaluating the impact of enforcement in Australia).
146.
Corporations Act 2001 (Austl.). Until recently, Australian corporate law
was state-based as the Australian Constitution does not give the Commonwealth
Parliament clear power to make law with respect to all companies. The lack of
uniformity across the states and territories created difficulties, leading to several
unsuccessful attempts to standardize the law beginning in the 1960s. By the early
1980s, arrangements were in place which resulted in the same corporate law being
applied in all Australian states and territories. However, it was not until 2001, when
each state agreed to refer their constitutional power to the Commonwealth Parliament,
that a truly national legislative scheme was adopted. For a history of the development
of Australia company law, see ROBERT AUSTIN & IAN RAMSAY, FORD'S PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATIONS LAW (14th ed. 2010); PHILLIP LIPTON, ABE HERZBERG & MICHELLE
WELSH, UNDERSTANDING COMPANY LAW (15th ed. 2010).
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corporate regulator, is an independent Commonwealth government
body charged with regulating "Australian companies, financial
markets, financial services organizations and professionals who deal
and advise in investments, superannuation, insurance, deposit taking
and credit."'1 47 ASIC has a variety of enforcement mechanisms at its
disposal, including the civil penalty provisions that are the focus of
this Article.
B. The Basic Structure of Australian CorporateLaw
Directors of Australian corporations are subject to fiduciary and
statutory duties. The fiduciary duties include the duty of loyalty and
care and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest. The statutory
directors' duties require all directors to "exercise their powers and
discharge their duties with a reasonable degree of care and
diligence,' 148 and to act in the best interests of the corporation and for
proper purposes. 149 All directors, other officers, and employees are
subject to additional statutory duties not to improperly use their
position 150 and not to improperly use certain information. 151 The
statutory duties apply to directors of both public and private
companies.' 5 2 They do not replace the fiduciary duties but operate in
153
addition to them.
The duty that most resembles the U.S. duty of oversight is the
duty of care and diligence. Section 180(1) of the Corporations Act
states:

147.
Our Role, AUSTL. SEC & INV. COMMISSION, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/
asic.nsf/byheadline/Our+role?openDocument#who (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). For a
history of corporate regulators in Australia, see Bernard Mees & Ian Ramsay,
Corporate Regulators in Australia (1961-2000): From Companies Registrars to ASIC,
22 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 212 (2008).
148.
CorporationsAct 2001 s 180(1) (Austl.).
149.
Id. s 181(1).
150.
See id. s 182(1) ("A director, secretary, other officer or employee of a
corporation must not improperly use their position to: (a) gain an advantage for
themselves or someone else; or (b) cause detriment to the corporation.").
151.
See id. s 183(1) ("A person who obtains information because they are, or
have been, a director or other officer or employee of a corporation must not improperly
use the information to: (a) gain an advantage for themselves or someone else; or (b)
cause detriment to the corporation."). For a discussion of the history of directors' duties
in Australia, see Jason Harris, Anil Hargovan & Janet Austin, Shareholder Primacy
Revisited: Does the Public Interest Have Any Role in Statutory Duties, 26 COMPANY &
SEC. L.J. 355, 360-61 (2008).
152.
See Corporations Act 2001 s 9 (defining "director" without distinguishing
between directors of private and public companies).
153.
See id. s 185 ("Sections 180 to 184... have effect in addition to, and not in
derogation of, any rule of law relating to the duty or liability of a person because of
their office or employment in relation to a corporation."). For a discussion of the
relationship between statutory remedies under the Corporations Act and equitable
remedies, see generally Joachim Dietrich & Thomas Middleton, Statutory Remedies
and Equitable Remedies, 28 AUSTL. B. REV. 136 (2006).
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A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers
and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a
reasonable person would exercise if they: (a) were a director or officer of
a corporation in the corporation's circumstances; and (b) occupied the
office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation
15 4
as, the director or officer.

This section imposes an objective "reasonable person" standard. The
standard of care varies according to the type of company, the type of
office held, and the responsibilities of the individual director.
However, while the standard may vary, it is clear that the law
imposes minimum standards of care and diligence on all directors.
The duty of care requires directors to "take reasonable steps to
place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management
of a company." 155 Directors are under a continuing obligation to make
inquiries and keep themselves informed about all aspects of the
company's business operations and financial position. 156 Directors are
allowed to make business judgments and take commercial risks, but
they cannot safely proceed on the basis of ignorance and a failure to
inquire. They cannot shut their eyes to corporate misconduct. 157
The duty of care is subject to a business judgment rule contained
in s 180(2) of the Corporations Act.' 58 However, directors in Australia
have rarely invoked the business judgment rule. On the few occasions
when directors attempted to rely on the business judgment rule, they

154.
CorporationsAct 2001 s 180(1).
See Daniels v Anderson (1995) 118 FLR 248, 306 (Austl.) (discussing the
155.
responsibilities of directors).
17 (Austl.)
156.
See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Healey [2011] FCA 717,
(listing the responsibilities a director has as including "keep[ing] informed about the
activities of the corporation"); Vines v Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n (2007) 233 FLR 1, 82
(Austl.) (emphasizing that the director should have taken steps to be sure he stayed
informed of relevant matters); Daniels (1995) 118 FLR at 308 (citing Barnes v.
Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)); Commonwealth Bank of Austl. v Friedrich(1991)
5 ACSR 115 (Austl.) ("[A] director is expected to be capable of understanding his
company's affaires to the extent of actually reaching a reasonably informed opinion of
its financial capacity.").
157.
Daniels (1995) 118 FLR at 309.
See CorporationsAct 2001 s 180(2). Under s 180(2):
158.
A director or other officer of a corporation who makes a business judgment is
taken to meet the requirements of subsection (1), and their equivalent duties at
common law and in equity, in respect of the judgment if they: (a) make the
judgment in good faith for a proper purpose; (b) do not have a material personal
interest in the subject matter of the judgment; (c) inform themselves about the
subject matter of the judgment to the extent they reasonably believe to be
appropriate; and (d) rationally believe that the judgment is in the best interests
of the corporation. The director's or officer's belief that the judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation is a rational one unless the belief is one that no
reasonable person in their position would hold.
Id. Section 180(3) defines business judgment as "any decision to take or not take action
in respect of a matter relevant to the business operations of the corporation." Id. s
180(3).
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were unsuccessful. 159 A possible explanation for this is that any
behavior by a director that constituted a breach of the duty of care in
s 180(1) would likely negate the business judgment rule in s 180(2).160
Like the United States, Australian fiduciary duties run to the
corporation and can be enforced by the corporation itself or by its
shareholders via a derivative suit. 161 However, unlike the United
States, the Australian statutory regime allows ASIC to take
enforcement action against directors personally in response to alleged
breaches of the statutory duties. 162 The statutory directors' duties are
enforced under the civil penalty regime. 163 ASIC can commence these
164
actions when it is in the public interest to do so.
1.

Sanctions for Breach of Duty

The civil penalty orders that can be sought include pecuniary
penalties, disqualification, and compensation orders. The maximum
pecuniary penalty that can be imposed following a declaration that a
director has breached the statutory duties is AUD $200,000 per
breach. 165 Pecuniary penalty orders can be imposed where the
contravention of duty "materially prejudices the interests of the
corporation or scheme, or its members; or materially prejudices the
corporation's ability to pay its creditors; or is serious. '166 Pecuniary

159.
Michael Legg & Dean Jordan, The Australian Business Judgment Rule
after ASIC v Rich, 62 KEEPING GOOD COMPANIES 388 (citing Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n
v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253 as an example where directors unsuccessfully attempted to
rely on the business judgment rule).
160.
Id. at 389.
161.
Id. s 236 (granting shareholders the right to bring proceedings on behalf of
the company).
162.
Id. ss 1317E, 1317J(1) (allowing ASIC to issue proceedings seeking civil
penalty orders following a contravention of the statutory directors' duties). The
statutory scheme also allows corporations to seek compensation orders following a
contravention of a statutory duty. See id. s 1317J(2).
163.
See Corporations Act 2001 s 1317J (detailing who may apply for a
declaration or order enforcing civil consequences when there is a contravention of civil
penalty provisions). A breach of the statutory duties other than the duty of care may,
under certain circumstances, constitute a criminal offense and criminal sanctions may
be imposed. See generally Corporations Act 2001 ss 181-184 (discussing civil
obligations and criminal sanctions). A contravention of the duty of care in s 180(1)
cannot constitute a criminal offense. A civil penalty application is the most severe
enforcement action that can be initiated by the ASIC in response to an alleged breach
of the statutory duty of care. Id.
164.
See Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) pt 1,
div 1(2) (Austl.) (setting out ASIC's public interest objectives).
165.
CorporationsAct 2001 s 1317G. The Australian dollar is roughly equivalent
to USD $1.07, making AUD $200,000 equal to approximately USD $214,000.
Australian Dollar to US Dollar Rate, XE, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert/
?Amount=1&From=AUD&To=USD (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
166.
CorporationsAct 2001 s 1317G(1).
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penalties ranging from AUD $5,000 to $450,000 have been imposed
since the inception of the regime in 1993.167
Before the court can order the payment of compensation, it must
be satisfied that a breach of duty has occurred and that the
corporation has suffered damage as a result of that breach. 168 The
amount of the compensation order cannot exceed the loss caused by
the breach. 169 Punitive damages are not authorized. 170 Typically the
amount ordered is equivalent to the loss caused by the director's
breach, 171 although in some cases a lesser amount has been
ordered. 172 Compensation orders have ranged from AUD $65,000173
174
to AUD $92 million.
The court may also order that a person be disqualified from
managing corporations for a period it thinks appropriate if it is
satisfied that disqualification is justified. Under s 206C(2) of the
Corporations Act, "[i]n determining whether the disqualification is
justified, the Court may have regard to: (a) the person's conduct in
relation to the management, business or property of any corporation;
'175
and (b) any other matters that the Court considers appropriate.

167.
See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483 (AustI.)
(imposing pecuniary penalties of $5,000 and $450,000 on former directors of HIH).
168.
See CorporationsAct 2001 ss 1317H(1), 1317HA(1) (clarifying requirements
for compensation orders).
169.
See id. s 1317H (providing that compensation can be ordered for damage
suffered as a result of a contravention of the directors' duty provisions). The section
does not specifically authorize compensation that exceeds the amount of damage
suffered. Id.
170.
See id. (providing for compensatory damages only).
171.
For example, in Australian Securities & Investment Commission v Rich
(2003) 44 ACSR 682 (Austl.), Mr. Keeling, a former director of One.Tel Ltd., consented
to a declaration of contravention being made that he contravened the duty of care. The
loss caused by the contravention was AUD $92 million. Id. A compensation order for
that amount was imposed. Id.
172.
For example, the quantum of the compensation order was less than the loss
caused by the defendant's contravention in Australian Securities & Investment
Commission v Forem-Freeway Enterprises. Pty. Ltd. (1999) 30 ACSR 339 (Austl.). In
this case, Justice Madgwick stated it would be difficult to accurately assess the amount
of the loss that had resulted from the defendant's contravention. Id. As the defendant
was bankrupt and there was little chance of any recovery, there was no need to
precisely assess the amount of the loss. Id.
173.
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Petsas (2005) 23 ACLC 269 (Austl.).
174.
Rich (2003) 44 ACSR 682.
175.
CorporationsAct 2001 (Cth) s 206C(2) (Austl.). Under s 206A(1), a person
who has been disqualified from acting as a director pursuant to the civil penalty regime
commits an offense if:
(a) they make, or participate in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a
substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or (b) they exercise the
capacity to affect significantly the corporation's financial standing; or (c) they
communicate instructions or wishes (other than advice given by the person in
the proper performance of functions attaching to the person's professional
capacity-or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation) to
the directors of the corporation: (i) knowing that the directors are accustomed
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There is no limit on the length of the disqualification order that can
be imposed. Australian courts have imposed several permanent
disqualification orders in recent years in cases where there were
multiple contraventions of multiple provisions.176
2.

Prohibition
Insurance

on

Indemnification

and

Company-Provided

In contrast to common practice in the United States, Australian
corporations are prohibited from exempting directors from liability for
pecuniary penalty and compensation orders imposed under the civil
penalty regime. 1 77 Nor is it possible to indemnify directors for legal
costs incurred defending civil penalty proceedings, if the director is
found to have breached his duty. 178 This prohibition extends to civil
penalty proceedings that seek pecuniary penalty, compensation, and
disqualification orders. Corporations are also prohibited from paying
for insurance against director liability arising from conduct that
involves a willful breach of duty. 1 79 While it is theoretically possible
for directors to obtain their own insurance policies, such policies
80
usually exclude coverage for liability arising from a willful breach.
Finally, due to the personal nature of the penalty, it is not possible to
insure against the impact of a disqualification order.
3.

The Rationale for the Civil Penalty Regime

It is generally accepted in Australia that there is a role for both
public and private enforcement of directors' duties. From as early as
the mid-twentieth century many Australian states recognized the
need to provide public authorities the ability to enforce directors'
duties. The first statutory duties that allowed for public enforcement
in the English-speaking world were adopted in the state of Victoria in

to act in accordance with the person's instructions or wishes; or (ii) intending
that the directors will act in accordance with those instructions or wishes.
Id. s 206C(2).
176.
See Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalty Orders:Assessing the AppropriateLength
and Quantum of Disqualificationand PecuniaryPenalty Orders, 31 AuSTL. B. REV. 96,
107 (2008) (noting that as of December 31, 2007, four such permanent disqualification
orders had been entered).
177.
See CorporationsAct 2001 s 199A(2) (forbidding indemnification of liability
for a pecuniary penalty under s 1317G or a compensation order under ss 1317H or
1317HA).
178.
See id. s 199A(3) (stating the conditions under which a company must not
indemnify a person against legal costs incurred in defending an action).
179.
See id. s 199B (discussing insurance premiums for certain liabilities).
180.
Michael Quinlan & Mark Lindfield, Directors' and Officers' Insurance, 22
COM. L.Q. 25 (2008) (Austl.), available at http://www.aar.com.au/pubs/pdf/insur/
pap4octO6.pdf.
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Australian states.

were quickly

adopted in
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many

other

The civil penalty regime was added to the national corporate law
in 1993. 183 Before then, the statutory directors' duties were
exclusively criminal provisions. 184 Advocates of the civil penalty
regime

argued

that

its

introduction

was

necessary

in

order

to

overcome difficulties associated with the existing criminal sanctions.

They maintained that the civil penalty regime would make it easier
to obtain penalty orders, and thereby enhance the deterrent effect of
18
the law.

5

Civil penalties were viewed as easier to obtain than traditional
86
Civil
criminal penalties because of the lighter standards of proof.'
penalty proceedings are treated as civil proceedings for the purposes

Companies Act 1958 (Vic) s 107 (Austl.). The Victorian duties were
181.
introduced following an inquiry into a series of self-interested transactions involving
the directors of Freighters Ltd., a publicly listed company. The inquiry found that
while no criminal law had been breached, certain transactions revealed "a complete
lack of appreciation of the standards demanded of and displayed by public company
directors." P.D. PHILLIPS, PARLIAMENTARY PAPER No. 2, REPORT OF THE INSPECTOR
APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE AFFAIRS OF FREIGHTERS LIMITED PURSUANT TO THE
PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES (SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS) ACT 1940 (1956) (Vic) 29
(Austl.); see also Harris, Hargovan & Austin, supra note 151, at 360-61 (discussing the
role of public interest in statutory duties).
182.
See, e.g., Companies Act 1961 (NSW) s 124 (Austl.) (establishing duties and
liabilities of officers in New South Wales). Until ASIC was established in 1991 as the
Australian Securities Commission (ASC), statutory duties were enforced by the
National Companies and Securities Commission and the Corporate Affairs offices of
the states and territories. In 1998, the ASC was renamed ASIC and assumed added
responsibilities for consumer protection in superannuation, insurance and, deposit
taking.
183.
Civil penalty provisions were introduced on the recommendation of the
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (the "Cooney
Committee"), which found that there had been a lack of public enforcement of the
directors' duties. Its advocates argued that the lack of successful prosecutions leading
to imprisonment led to community discontent and to a belief by some that the law had
fallen into disrepute, as there was no credible accountability mechanism for breaches of
the statutory duties. S. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL & CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., COMPANY DIRECTORS' DUTIES: REPORT ON THE SOCIAL AND
FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANY DIRECTORS 192 (1989) (Austl.)
[hereinafter COONEY REPORT].
184.
See Corporations Act 1989 (Cth) s 232(3) (Austl.) (stating the applicable
penalty for a contravention of duties as $20,000 or imprisonment for five years if "the
contravention was committed with intent to deceive or defraud the company, members
or creditors of the company or creditors of any other person or for any other fraudulent
purpose").
See COONEY REPORT, supra note 183, at 187-89.
185.
See Michael Gillooly & Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Civil Penalties in
186.
Australian Legislation, 13 U. TAS. L. REV. 269, 270 (1994) (Austl.).
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of applying the rules of evidence and procedure.1 8 7 The standard of
88
proof is proof on the balance of probabilities.1
Another perceived advantage was that the civil penalty regime
would limit the reach of criminal sanctions, which was seen as
desirable by those who believed that criminal sanctions were not
appropriate for regulatory offenses.' 8 9 The existing criminal sanctions
were retained for statutory duties other than the duty of care. 190
Thus, ASIC has at its disposal both criminal and civil penalties for
19 1
breaches of the directors' duties, other than the duty of care.
C. Enforcing the Duty of Care in Australia
U.S. and Australian corporate law share the same theoretical
objective-to ensure that corporate directors and officers work to

187.
See Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1317L (Austl.) (establishing the civil
evidence and procedure rules for declarations of contravention and civil penalty
orders).
188.
Id. s 1332. Given the nature of the penalties that can be imposed under
these provisions the courts have stated that the burden of proof is to be applied in
accordance with the manner described by Justice Dixon in Briginshaw v Briginshaw
(1938) 60 CLR 336, 368 (Austl.).
189.
See Mirko Bagaric, The "Civil.isation"of the Criminal Law, 25 CRIM. L.J.
184, 186-87, 192 (2001) (discussing proportionality between the purpose and the
means selected to achieve it); John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurring of the
Criminal and Civil Law Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875,
1876 (1992) (proposing that criminal law should be reserved for conduct that lacks
social utility whereas civil penalties should be used where the activity has positive
social utility but imposes externalities on others); AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N
FEDERAL CIVIL AND
PRINCIPLED REGULATION:
[ALRCI, REPORT No. 95,
3.37 (2003) (listing common arguments
ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES IN AUSTRALIA
against criminalizing regulatory contraventions).
190.
See CorporationsAct 2001 s 184 (detailing the circumstances under which a
contravention of the directors' duties contained in ss 181-183 will constitute a crime).
191.
COONEY REPORT, supra note 183, at 187. Michael Gething argues that in
relation to the directors' duties contained in the Corporations Act there is a need for a
range of sanctions to allow ASIC to effectively enforce the provisions. Michael Gething,
Do We Really Need Criminal and Civil Penalties for Contraventions of Directors'
Duties?, 24 AUSTL. BUS. L. REV. 375, 376 (1996); see also Vivien Goldwasser, CLERP
6-Implications and Ramifications for the Regulation of Australian FinancialMarkets,
17 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 206, 212 (1999) (Austl.). Another advantage of the provision of
a range of enforcement options that include civil penalties is that it can protect society
from both under-enforcement and over-enforcement. Civil penalties protect against
under-enforcement because they allow the regulator to take enforcement action in
situations where the conduct is not severe enough to justify the commencement of a
criminal prosecution. If civil penalties did not exist, these contraventions could be
subjected only to a civil action for damages. Civil penalties protect against overenforcement by "providing a noncriminal punitive sanction for conduct that otherwise
would be pushed into the criminal paradigm because its severity makes it
unreasonable to impose only a remedial sanction." Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795,
1865 (1992); see also SIMPSON, supra note 132, at 73-78 (discussing the use of civil law
to deter corporate crime).
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protect the interests of the corporation and its investors. In the
United States, directors' duties are enforced principally through
private litigation. In Australia, private enforcement against outside
directors plays an insignificant role, 192 but ASIC enjoys broad
enforcement authority. These differences in enforcement structure
matter little, however, unless the Australian system leads to different
results in cases involving failures of director oversight. If Australian
directors face no greater liability risk than U.S. directors, then there
will be no significant difference in accountability between the two
regimes.
A recent study by Professors Cheffins and Black assessed the
risk of personal liability for directors of Australian corporations and
concluded the risk was low. Professors Cheffins and Black examined
the incidence of out-of-pocket payments by directors of public
companies across a number of jurisdictions, including the United
States and Australia. 193 They reported that there did not appear to be
a single reported case where private litigation against directors
resulted in an outside director of an Australian public company being
ordered to pay out of pocket following a finding of a breach of duty of
care. 194 However, they did identify several cases where civil penalty
applications sought by ASIC resulted in out-of-pocket payments by

192.
The lack of private enforcement of directors' duties in Australia may be due
in part to cost rules which make it likely that plaintiffs who lose an application for
leave to bring a derivative suit will have costs ordered against them. Even if plaintiffs
succeed in the application for leave, they are not automatically entitled to an order that
the corporation pay the costs of the substantive suit. See Cheffins & Black, supra note
11, at 1433-35 (discussing the obstacles to derivative litigation). The introduction of
shareholder class actions and litigation funders in Australia may impact the number of
private suits filed against directors in the future. See Graeme Gurney & Michael Legg,
ShareholderActivism: Consumerism, Class Actions and Litigation Funding,25 AMPLA
Y.B. 255, 255-84 (2006) (Austl.); Shueh Hann Lim, Do Litigation FundersAdd Value to
Corporate Governance in Australia?, 29 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 135 (2011) (Austl.). For a
general discussion of the differences between the U.S. and Australian derivative
actions, see Lynden Griggs, The Statutory Derivative Action: Lessons That May Be
Learnt from Its Past!, 6 U.W. SYDNEY L. REV. 63 (2002); Lang Thai, How Popular Are
Statutory Derivative Actions in Australia? Comparisons with United States, Canada
and New Zealand, 30 AUSTL. Bus. L. REV. 118, 118-37 (2002); Kurt A. Goehre, Is the
Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United Kingdom Modernized Its Shareholder
Derivative Procedureand What the United States Can Learn from It, 28 WIS. INT'L L.J.
140 (2010) (comparing the statutory derivative procedure in the United Kingdom with
the United States and Australia).
193.
Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1385.
194.
See id. at 1433-34. The authors refer to Joanna Bird, The Duty of Care and
the CLERP Reforms, 17 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 141 (1999) (Austl.), which cites four cases
in which judgment was entered against a director for a breach of the duty of care
combined with other breaches. Id. at 150. None of these cases involved an outside
director of a public company. Id.; see also Hill, Regulatory Responses, supra note. 11, at
401 ("Traditionally the level of legal action against directors and officers in Australia
tended to be low.").
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directors. 195 After assessing directors' liability exposure in all of the
countries in their study, Cheffins and Black concluded that "the
largest source of risk [of personal liability] is efforts by government
agencies to make an example of particular directors."'196 The statutory
duties in Australia allow this risk to be realized.
ASIC has brought several additional high-profile actions against
outside directors of Australian corporations since the date of the
Cheffins and Black study. 197 These more recent cases suggest that
liability risks for outside directors are greater than previously
perceived.19 8 A review of ASIC's recent enforcement record shows
that a breach of statutory duties exposes directors to a nontrivial risk
of personal liability. In addition, as noted below, outside directors risk
having disqualification orders imposed against them. Cheffins and
Black did not address this risk in their study. 19 9
1.

ASIC's Enforcement Record

Between January 1, 2000, and July 31, 2011, ASIC commenced
civil penalty applications alleging a contravention of the statutory
duty of care on twenty occasions. 200 Most of these applications were
issued against multiple defendants, including a number of inside and
outside directors. Thirteen of these applications were issued against
directors of public corporations and seven were issued against
directors of private corporations. Although most applications alleged
that additional provisions of the Corporations Act had been breached,

195.
See Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1451 ("In Australia, all of the
instances of out-of-pocket liability resulted from ASIC enforcement proceedings.").
196.
Id. at 1385.
197.
See infra notes 206-35 and accompanying text (discussing recent ASIC
actions against outside directors).
198.
See Hill, Regulatory Responses, supra note 11, at 402 ("[Olne development
in Australia that has strengthened the enforcement of directors' duties is the
increasingly strategic use by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
(ASIC) of the civil penalty regime as a regulatory mechanism.").
199.
Cheffins & Black, supra note 11, at 1392 ("[W]e treat disqualification
[orders] as beyond the paper's scope because a financial penalty is not an intrinsic
aspect of the sanction.").
200.
See Media Releases and Advisories, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMMISSION,
http://www.asic.gov.auasic/ASIC.NSFbyHeadlineMedia%/20and%20information%20re
leases%20Home%2OPage (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). The author examined the
corresponding civil penalty judgments. To identify the civil penalty judgments the
author searched AustLII, CCH Online, and LexisNexis electronic databases.
The number of civil penalty applications may appear to be small but in the context
of the size of Australia's market when compared with the U.S. market, the number is
significant. For a detailed discussion of ASIC's enforcement patterns, see generally
HELEN BIRD ET AL., ASIC ENFORCEMENT PATTERNS (2003); Helen Bird et al., Strategic

Regulation and ASIC Enforcement Patterns: Results of an Empirical Study, 5 J. CORP.
L. STUD. 191 (2005).
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there were four cases where the only alleged contravention was a
contravention of the duty of care.
For the sake of comparison it is worth noting that Australia is
significantly smaller than the United States in terms of the size of its
population and its economy. Its population is roughly one-tenth that
of the United States 201 as is the size of its economy as measured by
GDP. 20 2 The United States has roughly three times as many publicly
traded corporations. 20 3 This sizable differential should be taken into
account when considering the number and type of enforcement
actions initiated by ASIC.
a.

The James Hardie Group

Several recent cases demonstrate the potential of ASIC's
enforcement actions to hold directors accountable for failures in
oversight. The civil penalty application that received the most
publicity in recent years is the James Hardie application issued by
ASIC in 2007.204 The James Hardie Group is a billion dollar global

enterprise that produces fiber-cement construction products, such 2as
05
exterior siding and roofing materials, used throughout the world.
The company had produced and distributed asbestos products during
much of the twentieth century. Cancers and respiratory illnesses
were linked to exposure to asbestos, and by 2001 there had been
numerous claims for compensation made against entities of the
James Hardie Group. While the group was no longer involved in the
sale of asbestos products, it was anticipated that it would face
20 6
significant future compensation claims.
In 2001, Hardie's board of directors considered a proposal to
restructure the company under a new holding company to be

201.
Australia has a population of approximately 22 million, compared with a
U.S. population of roughly 311 million. See Australian Demographic Statistics, June
2001, AUSTL.
BUREAU
STAT.
(Dec.
12,
2011),
http://wwww.abs.gov.au
ausstats/abs@nsf/94713ad445ffl425ca2568200192af2/1647509ef7e25faaca2568a901154
b63?opendocument (reporting Australia's population as of June 2011).
202.
Australia's GDP for 2009-2010 was AUD $1.3 trillion, compared with a
U.S. GDP of $14 trillion. Key Economic Indicators 2011, AUSTL. BUREAU STAT.,
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/1345.0?opendocument?opendocument
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
203.
Approximately 2,000 public companies are listed on the Australian
Securities Exchange (ASX), compared with roughly 7,000 listed companies on the two
major U.S stock exchanges. See Historical Market Statistics, AUSTL. SEC. EXCHANGE,
http://www.asx.com.au/researchIhistorical-equity-data.htm#
(last visited Mar. 1,
2012).
204.
See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Macdonald (No. 11) (2009) 230 FLR 1
(Austl.).
205.
About James Hardie, JAMEsHARDIE.COM, http://jameshardie.com.au/main/
about.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
206.
See Morley v Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n (2010) 274 ALR 205, $ 13 (Austl.)
(discussing the decision to create a trust).
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incorporated in the Netherlands. Under the proposed arrangement,
any future decisions of Australian courts regarding the company's
asbestos liability would not be enforceable. 207 In order for the
restructure to proceed, the James Hardie Group established a
Medical Research and Compensation Foundation (the Foundation) to
pay future asbestos related claims.208 There was great public interest
in ensuring that the Foundation would have sufficient funds to meet
all future claims. ASIC's civil penalty application arose as a result of
public statements made by the corporation about the sufficiency of
the funds in the Foundation.
ASIC issued civil penalty proceedings against two corporate
entities, three inside directors, and seven outside directors. ASIC
alleged that various public statements made by the James Hardie
Group of companies in relation to the funding of the Foundation were
false and misleading, or misleading and deceptive, and as a result the
corporations had breached various provisions of the Corporations
Act. 20 9 In addition, ASIC alleged that the inside and outside directors
had breached the duty of care contained in s 180 in the preparation
and approval of those statements. 210 One of those statements was a
draft Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) announcement stating
that the Foundation would have sufficient funds to meet all
legitimate asbestos claims, and that the Foundation was fully funded
and would provide certainty for people with legitimate asbestos
claims. Two of the outside directors attended the board meeting via
teleconference, and it was alleged that they approved the
announcements
without
seeing
them
or the
supporting
21
documentation. 1
At first instance, the trial court found that the outside directors
were in breach of their statutory duty of care and diligence in s 180(1)
because they approved the draft announcement when, due to the
information that was before them, the directors could not have been
satisfied that the company had a proper basis for making the
assertions contained in the announcement. The court found that:
All of the [outside] directors ... knew or should have known that if [the
James Hardie Group] made the statements as to the sufficiency of
funding of the Foundation in the Draft ASX Announcement there was
the danger that [it] would face legal action for publishing false or
misleading or misleading or deceptive statements, its reputation would
suffer and there would be a market reaction to its listed securities

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id.
12-13.
Id. 13.
Macdonald (2009) 230 FLR 1,
Id.
Id.

5-51.
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The fact that it was approved with its overstatement of the situation
as to the level of funding of the Foundation ... meant that they failed
in their duty to [the James Hardie Group] to protect it from the harm it
212
potentially faced upon publication of the Draft ASX Announcement.

Each of the outside directors was disqualified from managing
corporations for five years and ordered to pay pecuniary penalties of
AUD $30,000.213 The disqualification orders imposed on the inside
directors ranged from seven to fifteen years and the pecuniary
penalty orders ranged from AUD $75,000 to AUD $350,000.214
The outside directors successfully appealed this decision. 2 15 The
court of appeal was not satisfied that the board of directors had in
fact voted and approved the announcement that was made. However,
the court of appeal noted that it would have been satisfied that the
directors had breached the duty of care and diligence if it had not
overturned the factual finding. 216 ASIC has appealed this decision to
217
the High Court.
b.

Other ASIC Cases

Other cases in which the court imposed penalties on outside
directors of public companies include One.Tel, HIH, and Centro
Properties.In One.Tel, the court imposed civil penalties against John
Greaves, an outside director and chairman of the board. 218 Greaves
was chairman of the company's finance and audit committee. In 2004,
ASIC obtained a declaration that Greaves had breached the duty of
care by failing to take reasonable steps to monitor the financial
position of the group and failing to make timely recommendations to
the board that it cease trading or appoint an administrator. 219
Greaves was disqualified from acting as a director for four years and
was ordered to pay AUD $20 million in compensation plus ASIC's
costs. 220 ASIC's civil penalty proceedings against two other directors

Id.
259, 343.
212.
213.
Austi. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Macdonald (No. 12) (2009) NSWSC 714, 390
(Austl.).
214.
Id. 1 487-90.
Morley v Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n (2010) 274 ALR 205 (Austl.).
215.
Id. 796.
216.
217.
The High Court is the last court of appeal in Australia. Role of the High
Court, HIGH CT. AUSTL., http:llwww.hcourt.gov.au/about/role (last visited Mar. 1,
2012).
218.
One.Tel Ltd., was a listed telecommunications company that collapsed in
2001 with losses of approximately AUD $92 million. See ASIC Loses Epic OneTel Case,
ABC, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-11-18/asic-loses-epic-onetel-case/114 7614 (last
updated Nov. 18, 2009) (announcing ASIC's loss to One.Tel in the 2009 legal battle
against two of the One.Tel directors over the 2001 collapse of the company).
4 (Austl.)
See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Rich (2004) 50 ACSR 500,
219.
(discussing the alleged contraventions of the Corporations Law).
220.
Id. 92.
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of One.Tel Ltd. were dismissed because ASIC failed to prove its
22 1
pleaded case.
In HIH, ASIC issued civil penalty proceedings against a number
of HIH directors including Rodney Adler, an outside director. Prior to
its collapse in 2001, the HIH Group was the second largest general
insurer in Australia. 222 ASIC's claim related to the directors' approval
of an undocumented payment of AUD $10 million to a corporation
controlled by Adler in the period of time leading up to the
corporation's collapse. 223 Following a finding that he had breached
the duty of care, other statutory directors' duties, and other
provisions of the Corporations Act, Adler was disqualified from
managing corporations for twenty years and ordered to pay a total of
AUD $450,000 in pecuniary penalties and almost AUD $8 million in
2 24
compensation.
A more recent case, Centro Properties, also ended with liability
findings against inside and outside directors of a publicly traded
company. Centro Properties is the second largest retail property
operator in Australia, with revenues of AUD $1.3 billion. 225 On June
27, 2011, one inside and six outside directors of various entities
within the Centro Properties Group and Centro Retail Group were
found to have breached the statutory duty of care for approving the
consolidated financial statements of the public company and trusts
within the group for the 2007 fiscal year. 226 The financial statements
did not comply with the relevant accounting standards and
regulations because they incorrectly classified short-term current
liabilities and long term debt.2 27 The court found that the information
omitted from financial statements was significant for the purpose of
assessing the risks faced by the Centro Group. Centro nearly
collapsed in 2007 when it announced that it could not refinance AUD
$3.9 billion of debt. 228 The court found that the directors either were
aware of the omitted information, or that reasonably competent
229
directors in their positions should have been aware.

221.
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Rich (2009) 236 FLR 1, 25.1 (Austl.).
222.
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253, 267 (Austl.).
223.
Id. at 260.
224.
Adler (2002) 168 FLR 253.
225.
Centro Properties Group, INVESTSMART, http://www.investsmart.com.au/
shares/asx/CENTRO-PROPERTIES-GROUP-CNP.asp
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012)
(recording Centro's revenues from ordinary activities at approximately AUD $1.33
billion); Centro Shares Continue Plummet, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Dec. 18, 2007),
http://www.smh.com.aulbusiness/centro-shares-continue-plummet-20071218-lhqq.html.
226.
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Healey [2011] FCA 717, 7 1-5 (Austl.).
227. The amount that was the subject of the claim exceeded AUD $3.2 billion. Id.
9.
228.
See Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Healey (2011) 196 FCR 430,
66-76
(Austl.) (discussing the consequence of the omissions).
229.
Id. T 11.
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On August 31, 2011 the court disqualified one of the inside
directors from managing corporations for two years, and imposed a
pecuniary penalty of AUD $30,000 on the other inside director. 230 The
outside directors argued that they should be relieved from liability
altogether and that no declarations of contravention should be made.
However, the court disagreed, stating that this was not a case:
[W]here a mere warning "not to do it again," without more, [was]
appropriate.... A judicial reprimand in the form of merely finding a
contravention (without appropriate declarations) [was] not a substitute
231
for punishment, and [was] not appropriate here.

Although the court issued declarations of contravention against the
outside directors, it declined to impose the disqualification orders
ASIC sought. 232 According to the court, the declarations of
contravention were "sufficient to 'send the message' to the community
that the court strongly disapproves of the conduct giving rise to the
contraventions, ' '233 and the disqualification orders were unnecessary
and excessive. 234 The Centro case is one of few civil penalty
applications where a declaration of contravention was made and no
penalty orders imposed. In most cases at least one of the available
penalties was imposed following a declaration of contravention.
2.

Assessing the Impact of ASIC Enforcement

Overall, ASIC has achieved a high degree of success with the
civil penalty applications it has issued. As of July 31, 2011, fifteen of
the twenty civil penalty applications alleging a breach of the duty of
care issued between January 1, 2000 and July 31, 2011 have been
finalized. 235 ASIC obtained a declaration that the duty of care had
been contravened by at least one of the defendant directors in twelve
of those fifteen cases. 236 Many of these civil penalty applications were

Id. 7 109, 134.
230.
Id. 187.
231.
Id.
188 ("The punishment element (which a disqualification order
232.
encompasses), has already been inflicted by the failure to relieve from liability and the
making of the declarations in light of the reputational damage already inflicted upon
these particular directors.").
Id.
191 (expressing disapproval but also expressing sympathy regarding
233.
"the circumstances of the non-executive directors, the circumstances leading to the
contraventions, and subsequent events").
Id. 7 187-91.
234.
See generally Media Releases and Advisories, supra note 200 (providing
235.
information on the civil penalty applications).
See Michelle Welsh, Civil Penalties and Responsive Regulation: The Gap
236.
Between Theory and Practice, 33 MELB. U. L. REV. 908, 932 (2009) (discussing ASIC's
success with civil penalty applications). The Hardie case and the Fortescue case are
counted as not finalized because they are currently on appeal before the Australian
High Court. See Press Release, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n, 11-214MR Decision in
available at
29,
2011),
(Sept.
Appeal
Metals
Group
Fortescue
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issued against high-profile directors. 237 When these high-profile
proceedings are successful they not only ensure that the offending
director is held to account for his or her wrongdoing, but the publicity
generated sends a strong deterrent message to other directors in the
238
community.
In particular, the cases involving James Hardie, Centro, and
HIH attracted significant publicity. The judgments sent a strong
deterrent message to directors that the cost of not complying with the
duty of care can be significant, especially if lengthy disqualification
orders are imposed. Arguably a disqualification order of any length
will end the career of outside directors of public companies. Of equal
importance is the fact that these cases send a strong message to the
business community about the standard of behavior that is expected
of outside directors of public companies. This message is important
for the vast number of directors motivated by normative and social
factors. What is moral and socially desirable is shaped by both the
attitudes of the regulatory authorities-in this case ASIC-and the
courts in relation to contraventions of that law. A vigorous
enforcement of the law influences such persons' perception of the
importance of the law, and therefore their commitment to compliance.
Despite its level of success, in recent years ASIC's ability to
obtain civil penalty orders was impacted by several court decisions
that placed greater procedural burdens on the regulator. The
objective of the civil penalty regime was to provide ASIC with a
penalty that was easier to obtain than criminal sanctions. However,

http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsflbyheadline/I 1-214MR+Decision+in+Fortescue+
Metals+Group+appeal?openDocument (regarding the Fortescue case); Press Release,
Austl. See. & Inv. Comm'n, 11-98MR ASIC Granted Special Leave to Appeal James
Hardie Decision (May 13, 2011), available at http://www.asic.gov.aulasic/
asic.nsfIbyheadline/1 1-98+MR+ASIC+granted+special+leave+to+appeal+James+
Hardie+decision?openDocument (regarding the Hardie case).
237.
These cases include the applications issued against the directors of the HIH
group of companies, One.Tel Ltd., AWB, the James Hardie Group, and Centro
Properties. See supraPart IV.C.i.a-b.
238.
For examples of "Lawyers Advisories," issued to warn their clients about
the impact of the cases, see Priscilla Bryans, ASIC v Healey, FREEHILLS (June 28,
2011), http://www.freehills.com/7288.aspx (providing a summary of the practical
implications of the Healey case); Angela Pearsall & Elspeth Arnold, The James Hardie
Appeals: Implications for Directors and Senior Management, BLAKE DAWSON (Mar. 8,
2011),
http://www.blakedawson.comlTemplates/Publications/x_article-content-page.
aspx?id=61343 (providing a summary of the impact of the Hardiecase); Adam Strauss,
James Hardie - A Higher Bar for General Counsel?, FREEHILLS (June 29, 2009),
http://www.freehills.com/5163.aspx (same); What Does the Centro Case Mean for
Directors?, CLAYTON UTZ (June 29, 2011), http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/
news/201106f29/what does the-centrocase-mean for.. directors.page
(same);
The
Centro Eight - ASIC Turns up the Heat on Company Directors and Executives,
MCCULLOUGH ROBERTSON (June 30, 2011), http://www.mccullough.com.au/icmsdocs/
100198_TheCentro Eight-_ASIC turns.upthe heat on company_directorsand_
executives.pdf (same).
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various protections introduced by the courts in civil penalty
proceedings have made it difficult for ASIC to succeed in several
recent civil penalty applications. 2 39 There has been at least one case
240
in which ASIC suffered a high-profile defeat in recent years.

Nonetheless,

civil

penalties

remain

important

regulatory

mechanisms. The penalty regime allows ASIC to take enforcement
action in situations where it would otherwise be unable to act.2 41 The

duty of care contained in s 180 of the Corporations Act does not
attract criminal liability, so without the civil penalty regime, courtbased enforcement action instigated by the regulator would not be

possible. According to ASIC,

civil penalty applications

feature

strongly in what it regards as the key results it achieves each year.

24 2

While ASIC's use of the civil penalty regime likely has had an
impact on compliance levels, we acknowledge that there is no reliable
method of testing this hypothesis empirically. One cannot prove that

public enforcement has provided an effective deterrent, set minimum
standards of corporate managerial behavior, or encouraged directors
and officers motivated by calculated, normative, or social factors to
comply more readily with their duty of care. There is simply no
accurate way to measure compliance levels with the duty of care. The
use of surveys to measure compliance has previously been seen to be

239.
See Tom Middleton, The Difficulties of Applying Civil Evidence and
ProcedureRules in ASIC's Civil Penalty Proceedings Under the CorporationsAct 2001
Cth, 21 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 507 (2003) (Austl.) (advocating for the introduction of a
uniform civil code for all Corporations Act civil proceedings, including civil penalty
proceedings); Peta Spender, Negotiating the Third Way: Developing Effective Process in
Civil Penalty Litigation, 26 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 249 (2008) (Austl.); Michelle Welsh,
The Regulatory Dilemma: The Choice Between Overlapping Criminal Sanctions and
Civil Penaltiesfor Contraventionsof the Directors' Duty Provisions, 27 COMPANY & SEC.
L.J. 370 (2009) (Austl.).
240.
In One.Tel, ASIC obtained declarations of contravention and civil penalty
orders against Keeling and Greaves in 2003 and 2004, respectively, but suffered a
high-profile defeat when in 2009 the court declared that it had failed to make out its
case against the other directors, Rich and Silberman. Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Rich
(2009) 236 FLR 1 (Austl.).
241.
Welsh, supra note 236, at 932.
242.
An examination of the ASIC annual reports from 2001-2002 to 2009-2010
reveals that civil penalty proceedings are prominent in the matters identified as 'key'
or 'significant' for each year. The annual reports can all be accessed on the ASIC
website, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMMISSION, http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/
byheadline/Annual+reports?openDocument (last visited Mar. 1, 2012). AUSTL. SEC. &
INV. COMM'N [ASIC], ANNUAL REPORT 2002-03: FIGHTING FRAUD AND MISCONDUCT 23,
27 (2003); ASIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2003-04: BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN FINANCIAL
MARKETS 14-15 (2004); ASIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2004-05: PATROLLING A BROAD
TERRITORY 16 (2005); ASIC, ANNUAL REPORT 2005-06: WORKING FOR AUSTRALIA CONSUMERS, INVESTORS, BUSINESS AND MARKETS 18 (2006); ASIC, ANNUAL REPORT
06-07: REGULATING IN A TIME OF GROWTH - MARKETS, BUSINESS, INVESTORS AND
CONSUMERS 16 (2007); ASIC, ANNUAL REPORT 07-08: A YEAR OF CHANGE 14-15 (2008);
ASIC, ANNUAL REPORT 08-09: A YEAR OF CONSOLIDATION 4 (2009) ASIC, ANNUAL
REPORT 09-10: A YEAR OF ACHIEVEMENT 18 (2010).
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unreliable. 243 Similarly, measuring the number of enforcement
actions alleging a contravention of the duty of care over a certain
period of time would not give a true indication of compliance levels. A
rise or fall in the number of enforcement actions initiated by ASIC
may not indicate a rise or fall in compliance with the duty of care.
Changes in enforcement statistics may be caused by many factors,
including changes in the regulator's enforcement priorities,
244
personnel, resources, and surveillance capabilities.
However, one can draw on the results of an empirical study
previously undertaken by one of the authors. This study measured
24 5
the impact of ASIC's enforcement of a different statutory provision.
The research was undertaken in the context of the Australian
continuous disclosure provisions, which require listed corporations to
disclose price sensitive information to the ASX as soon as the
corporation becomes aware of that information. 246 The author
collected empirical data by counting the number of price sensitive
disclosures and mapping those disclosures against the introduction of
different enforcement regimes and changes in enforcement practices
by ASIC.

24 7

This study showed that a marked increase in the number of
announcements occurred immediately following a period when ASIC

243.
For a discussion of the difficulties associated with reliance on selfassessment including the possibility of misrepresentation, see Henk Elffers et al.,
ExplainingRegulatory Non-compliance:A Survey Study of Rule Transgressionfor Two
Dutch Instrumental Laws, Applying the Randomized Response Method, 19 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 409, 411 (2003).

244.
Previous studies have highlighted the difficulties associated with
measuring compliance levels more generally. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Just in
Crime: Guiding Economic Crime Reform After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 34 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 359, 414 (2003) (noting that the true indicator of the success of a
deterrence-based strategy is the number of individuals who comply with the law,
despite temptations to do otherwise). Ramirez also notes, however, that people do not
ordinarily announce such decisions; therefore, it is usually not possible to count their
incidence. Id.; see also Elffers et al., supra note 243, at 410 (reporting that the lack of
statistics on compliance was one of the causes of the scarcity of empirical research in
this area).
245.
Michelle Welsh, New Sanctions and Increased Enforcement Activity in
Corporate Law: Impact and Implications, 41 COMMON L. WORLD REV. (forthcoming
2012) (on file with authors).
246.
The project examined the incidence of disclosure of price sensitive
information to the ASX to determine whether or not the introduction of new
enforcement regimes and the use of those regimes by ASIC corresponded with an
increase in the level of compliance by listed corporations with the continuous disclosure
requirements. The project comprised a quantitative study of the levels of corporate
disclosure from 1993 to 2007 and an analysis of a series of interviews with company
secretaries of six corporations listed on the ASX and one partner of a legal firm who, at
the date of the interview, was an outside director of a number of listed corporations.
247.
The project included a quantitative study of the levels of disclosure from
1993 to 2007. Welsh, supra note 245.
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increased its enforcement activity. 248 This finding suggests that
enforcement action by ASIC is an important factor in encouraging
corporate compliance. ASIC enforcement proceedings may act as a
deterrent to persons motivated by calculated factors who are inclined
toward noncompliance. A perceived increase in the risk that a
contravention may result in enforcement activity may also strengthen
a commitment to compliance by persons motivated by social and
normative factors. The perceived legitimacy and importance of the
continuous disclosure requirements may have increased when ASIC
began to enforce them actively.
The results of this research support our hypothesis that an
effective accountability mechanism plays an important role in
encouraging corporate compliance. Enforcement activity can increase
the deterrent effect of the law. In addition, an effective accountability
mechanism evidenced by enforcement activity encourages corporate
actors who are motivated by normative and social factors to
implement measures to ensure that their corporations are compliant.

V. ENVISIONING PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT OF DIRECTORS'
DUTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

In the United States, the federal securities law regime provides
for overlapping and concurrent public and private remedies for
securities law violations. In addition, federal law coexists with state
securities laws, which also provide for both public and private
enforcement. Under state corporate laws, where most substantive
standards for director conduct arise, there are no provisions for public
enforcement of fiduciary duties. Given the broad public interest in
effective corporate governance, the absence of mechanisms for formal
public oversight of director conduct is striking.

248.
Id. As part of the study, the author conducted several interviews with
company secretaries and/or assistant company secretaries from six listed corporations,
and with a partner in a law firm who was a nonexecutive director on the boards of a
number of listed corporations. The interviewees identified many factors that were
important from a compliance perspective. One of those factors was enforcement activity
by the regulator. Id. Not only was enforcement viewed as important in relation to
corporate actors motivated by calculated factors toward noncompliance, enforcement
action by ASIC impacts compliance-focused corporate actors. Most interviewees agreed
that enforcement action focused their attention on an issue and usually led to a review
of the corporation's internal processes and procedures to ensure that the company was
compliant. Id. The interviewees discussed the issue of personal liability of directors.
While some interviewees expressed reservations about the appropriateness of imposing
personal liability, almost all conceded that directors were more likely to pay attention
to issues of compliance when there was a possibility of personal liability. For example,
one interviewee stated that, "nothing is more effective than directors being in the 'gun,'
civilly, and particularly, criminally."
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It is important to acknowledge that U.S. regulators can pursue
cases involving financial misstatements and fraud through the'
securities enforcement regime. However, such enforcement actions
rarely impact a firm's outside directors. 249 For example, independent
investigations of the Enron, WorldCom, and Lehman failures
revealed serious lapses in director oversight, yet regulators did not
charge any of the directors of these corporations with fraud.250
Although outside directors of these corporations faced private
shareholder suits, only Enron and WorldCom directors made personal
payments to settle such claims. 251 Furthermore, the personal
payments included in the Enron and WorldCom settlements were
anomalies that have not been replicated since. 252 Loyalty-based
253
claims also rarely lead to personal payments by outside directors.
Thus, even in cases involving financial misstatements, self-dealing,
and fraud, outside directors in Australia are more likely to face
enforcement actions and personal penalties than similarly situated
directors in the United States.
Although Australia's regulatory regime seems to offer some
advantages over the U.S. system, the U.S. corporate governance
system does not easily lend itself to adopting the Australian
approach. Deeply ingrained concepts of federalism in the United
States make imagining public enforcement of fiduciary duties appear
somewhat fanciful. The United States divides authority over
corporate regulation between federal and state authorities, with state
governments taking the lead in defining and enforcing fiduciary
duties.254 This traditional division of labor presents challenges to
reforming U.S. corporate law along the Australian model. Despite
these conceptual obstacles, careful analysis of U.S. enforcement
practices suggests that such reforms would be less radical than they
may appear at first blush.

249.
Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1062 (finding only one
instance where an SEC enforcement action led to an out-of-pocket payment by an
outside director).
250.
See id. at 1126-27 (describing the independent investigations revealing
omissions and material misstatements reflecting oversight failure at Enron and
WorldCom).
251.
Id. at 1057.
252.
Id. at 1063-64 ("From 1980 onwards-as far back as we looked-we found a
total of thirteen cases in which outside directors made out-of-pocket payments ....
Ten
of these cases involved oversight failure, two involved self-dealing or duty of loyalty
claims, and one involved a claim that a transaction involving directors' own
compensation was ultra vires.").
253.
See id. at 1063-64, 1112 (noting that directors make personal payments in
only a tiny percentage of cases and that directors' risk for out-of-pocket liability in
director oversight claims is very low).
254.
See Jones, supra note 5, at 110.

392

VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45.343

A. Some Advantages of Australia'sEnforcement Regime
One advantage of the Australian system is that it allows
proceedings alleging a breach of the duty of care to be issued against
directors when it is in the public interest to do so. Mechanisms for
director accountability do not rely solely on incentives for private
litigators working on a contingent basis. In the United States, courts
and commentators worry that such incentives often lead lawyers to
pursue speculative cases in pursuit of large damage awards, or pass
up meritorious cases if the prospective damages are too small to
justify the risk of litigation. 255 By contrast, in Australia, ASIC can
take up a case in the public interest even when the size of the case
would not warrant a contingent fee lawsuit.
Another advantage of the Australian system is that public
enforcement provides the prospect of personal accountability for
directors through the imposition of disqualification orders and
pecuniary penalties that cannot be indemnified or insured at
company expense. This regulatory flexibility means the regulator can
provide for penalties that will deter those motivated chiefly by
calculated factors, while also providing more modest penalties for less
culpable actors to reinforce norms for those motivated by normative
and social factors.
1.

Pecuniary Penalties

In the United States, the penalties for a breach of fiduciary duty
can be harsh and, according to some, disproportionate to a director's
degree of culpability. 25 6 Legal sanctions for breach of duty are not tied
to the seriousness of a director's misconduct. Instead the penalty is
determined by the losses that a company suffers as a result of the
breach. 257 Thus, "[flor a multibillion dollar company, a single mistake
could mean millions of dollars of damages to be borne by the
directors. '258 As one of us has previously argued, two problems can
arise from depending on draconian penalty schemes to discipline
directors. First, if the requisite penalty is harsh, courts may be

255.
See Stephen Choi, The Evidence in Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 1465, 1489 (2004) (describing factors attorneys consider when deciding whether to
pursue litigation, including the risk that damages awards will not be high enough to
cover attorney's costs); Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims
and Private Securities Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 574 (2000) (explaining that
asymmetric risks affect lawyers' decisions in settlement and bringing claims).
256.
Jones, supra note 5, at 148.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.

2012]

TOWARD A PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT MODEL

reluctant to impose it, and second, harsh penalty schemes may
259
undermine the internalization of proper moral values.
One advantage we see in the Australian enforcement regime is
that pecuniary penalties can be calibrated to reflect the seriousness of
the harm and the degree of culpability of the director. Pecuniary
penalties that are capped at AUD $200,000 are less severe than the
damages awards or settlements of the size likely to attract contingent
fee litigators. 260 If the United States adopted a similar system,
whereby pecuniary penalties are calibrated to reflect an individual
director's culpability, such flexibility could help overcome some of the
objections that the tort measure of damages raises in the current
enforcement regime.
2.

Disqualification Orders

ASIC is also authorized to seek disqualification orders, which
can serve multiple objectives. The orders protect the public from
future harm that may be caused by inattentive or incompetent
directors. They also serve as an individual deterrent, and as a form of
punishment. 26 1 Most importantly, the disqualification order ensures a
measure of personal accountability for directors that is not available
under the U.S. system. Unlike monetary settlements and damages

259.
See id. at 148-52 (summarizing nullification problems and reviewing
studies showing that harsh penalties can interfere with internalization of proper moral
values).
260.
Compensation orders are also available under the Australian regime to
compensate victims of wrongdoing. The quantum of a compensation order is limited to
the loss suffered as a result of the contravention and punitive damages are not
available. See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
261.
Australian courts have recognized that the main aim of the disqualification
order is to provide protection for the wider public. For example, in Australian
Securities & Investment Commission v Adler [2002] NSWSC 483, 56, the court noted
that the public needs protection against the misuse of the corporate structure by
directors who are unfit to hold office. In Australian Securities & Investment
Commission v Forem-Freeway Enterprises Pty. Ltd. (1999) 30 ACSR 339, the court
recognized that the aim of the disqualification order is to protect the public, and as a
result, the capacity of the defendant to cause harm to the public must be given
consideration by the court when it is deciding whether or not to impose a
disqualification order. Australian courts also recognize that the imposition of a
disqualification order involves aspects of personal and general deterrence, and that it
can have a punitive effect. See Austi. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Beekink (2007) 61 ACSR
305, 314-15 ("What is required in their case is a penalty sufficient to satisfy the
punitive objectives of the applicable law, to be seen to be a personal deterrent and to be
apparent as a deterrent to the general public against a repetition of like conduct.");
Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Maxwell (2006) 59 ACSR. 373,
150 (listing principles
and factors in finding disqualification orders); Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v Vines (2006)
58 ACSR 298, 311-2, 333, 346 (describing the punitive penalties to the directors and
that they should be no greater than necessary to achieve the deterrent purpose); Austi.
Sec. & Inv. Comm'n v White (2006) 58 ACSR 261, 265-67; Austl. Sec. & Inv. Corm'n v
Plymin (2003) 21 ACLC 1237, 1241.
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awards, a disqualification order cannot be indemnified or insured
away.
One of us conducted interviews with a former senior enforcement
officer from ASIC. The officer stated that ASIC sees disqualification
262
orders as the most important of the three orders that are available.
Disqualification orders are important and useful remedies because
they provide a mechanism whereby people who should not manage
2 63
corporations are removed from such positions.
Pecuniary penalties and disqualification orders help promote
accountability for corporate officials in Australia. Because the
penalties are comparatively mild and can be tailored to be
proportionate to the harm caused and the degree of culpability of each
individual director, courts may be more likely to impose such
penalties when the circumstance warrant. Disqualification orders act
as personal and general deterrents. They allow for the removal of
incompetent directors, and most importantly, directors cannot
contract out of the personal impact of such orders.
B. Implementing Public Enforcement
U.S.
policymakers
should
consider
Australia's
public
enforcement model. In particular, the disqualification order, or bar on
future service as a director, is a remedy that should be added to the
arsenal of state and federal regulators, so that they may more
effectively enforce directors' oversight duties. Despite the many
salutary aspects of the Australian enforcement regime, any effort to
adopt a comparable system in the United States would face a number
of challenges. America's peculiar brand of corporate federalism
creates ideological and conceptual barriers that must be overcome
before the United States could embrace public enforcement of
fiduciary duties.
1.

Federalism Constraints

Corporate federalism concepts present the most significant
obstacle to adoption of public enforcement of fiduciary duties in the
United States. There are at least two ways that federalism notions

262.
Interview with Senior Enforcement Officer, Austl. Sec. & Inv. Comm'n, in
Melb., Austl. (Dec. 8, 2006). The senior enforcement officer requested that she not be
named and that no direct quotations be attributed to her. See also Welsh, supra note
236, at 929 (expressing that prior to beginning a civil penalty application, ASIC
considers alternative available remedies such as disqualification orders as a regulatory
response).
263.
See generally Welsh, supra note 176 (explaining that the courts' view that
disqualification orders protect the public from actions of incapable directors impacts
the length of disqualification).

20121

TO WARD A PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT MODEL

could impede implementation of a public enforcement regime. First,
unlike ASIC, the SEC lacks formal authority to enforce corporate law
rules. Although the SEC's enforcement powers mirror ASIC's to a
significant extent, the United States has no federal corporate statute.
Instead, corporate law is the province of the states and each state has
its own statute enforced by its judiciary. 264 Further, states do not
provide mechanisms for public officials to enforce directors' duties.
Instead, the state law system relies exclusively on shareholder
265
litigation to police director conduct.
Given the existing corporate governance structure, providing for
public enforcement of fiduciary duties would require one of two
possible reforms. The first would be to empower the SEC explicitly to
enforce directors' fiduciary duties. The second would be for states to
empower its public officials to oversee director conduct. Standard
federalism conventions would likely complicate efforts to adopt either
reform. Yet careful examination of the powers and practices of state
and federal regulators reveals that the types of reforms envisioned
here represent a logical extension of state and federal regulators'
existing enforcement powers.
2.

SEC Enforcement

One possible mechanism for creating public enforcement of
directors' oversight duties would be to grant the SEC explicit
authority to enforce the director obligations that were created under
federal statutes such as Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank. As the law
stands, the SEC already has the power to penalize securities law
violations that also constitute fiduciary breaches. As many
commentators have noted, cases of corporate fraud often involve
fiduciary breaches, as when directors fail to prevent misleading
266
public statements or fraudulent financial reports.
Since 1990, the SEC has enjoyed explicit power to bar those who
violate the securities laws' anti-fraud provisions from future service
as an officer or director of any public company. 267 In 2002, the

264.
See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons
from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1829-31 (2006) (discussing limitations on state
courts' ability to police corporate misconduct).
265.
See id. at 1831 (noting that states' failure to provide for public enforcement
of corporate law may lead to under-enforcement of corporate norms).
266.
See Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993)
("In the twentieth century state corporate law norms for the large publicly held
corporation have been progressively supplanted by federal standards .... ); Robert B.
Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections
upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-63 (2003) (observing that U.S. corporate
governance is now largely the province of federal securities law).
267.
See Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the "Unfitness" Question, 47 ARIZ. L.
REV. 9, 13-14 (2005) [hereinafter Barnard, Unfitness Question] (describing the SEC's
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act eased the SEC's burden in seeking such bars.
First, Sarbanes-Oxley lowered the standard for imposing a bar from
"substantial unfitness" to serve as an officer or director to mere
"unfitness. ' 26 8 Second, Sarbanes-Oxley allows the SEC to impose bars
in administrative proceedings in addition to federal court
26 9
proceedings.
Despite this expanded authority, the SEC has remained
reluctant to impose bars as a remedy for director oversight failures.
Instead, the SEC seeks bars against outside directors only in the
most egregious cases, where directors flagrantly disregarded multiple
red flags indicating fraud. 270 Recent SEC cases pursuing bars against
outside directors have focused on members of the audit committee,
particularly committee chairs who assumed some investigative
responsibilities. For example, in two recent enforcement actions
against outside directors, the directors had ignored multiple employee
warnings, ignored auditor and law firm resignations, or allowed
retain their positions of
executives suspected of misconduct to
271
authority and thus continue their fraud.

authority to impose bar orders under the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990); Jayne W. Barnard, When Is a Corporate Executive
"Substantially Unfit to Serve'?, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1522 (1992) (noting that the
potential impact of the Remedies Act's debarment powers); Jon Carlson, Note,
Securities Fraud, Officer and DirectorBars, and the Unfitness Inquiry After SarbanesOxley, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 679, 685 (2009) (noting that when Congress
passed the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act it sought to
"maximize the remedial effects of its enforcement actions" and to "achieve the
appropriate level of deterrence in each case").
268.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 1105, 116 Stat. 745,
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-l(0, 78u-3(f) (2006)).
269.
Id.; Barnard, Unfitness Question, supra note 267, at 19-20.
270.
See Floyd Norris, For Boards, SEC Keeps the Bar Low, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2011, at B1 ("[T]he commission has chosen not to proceed in cases in which there was
anything less than severe recklessness. If directors relied on experts like law firms or
auditing firms, they have received the benefit of the doubt. No outside directors of
financial firms were named as defendants in cases the S.E.C. filed that stemmed from
the credit crisis."); John F. Olson, SEC Targets Directors Who Ignore Red Flags, in
CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTIcE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 328 (2011) ("[Tlhe
Commission rarely sues directors solely in their capacity as directors. In fact, in the
last three years, during which we brought more than 1800 enforcement actions
involving more than 3,000 defendants and respondents, the Commission has sued less
than a dozen outside directors." (quoting former Enforcement Director Linda Chatman
Thomsen)); Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Military Body
Armor Supplier and Former Outside Directors with Accounting Fraud (Feb. 28, 2011)
('We will not second-guess the good-faith efforts of directors. But in stark contrast [the
defendants] repeatedly turned a blind eye to warning signs of fraud and other
misconduct by company officers." (quoting Director of Enforcement, Robert Khuzami)).
271.
See Complaint, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Gupta, No. 11-7566 (S.D.N.Y Oct.
26, 2011), 2011 WL 5105859 (presenting claims against former outside directors of
InfoUSA); Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Krantz,
No. 11-60432 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011), 2011 WL 680181 (presenting claims against
former outside directors of DHB Industries).
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If the SEC pursued such bars more readily it might neutralize
some of the common objections to enforcing directors' duties. The bar
is more meaningful as a reputational sanction than monetary
payments, because the signal from being named in a lawsuit or
paying a settlement is ambiguous. 2 72 Further, a bar prevents indolent
directors of companies brought down by fraud from serving in similar
273
capacities at other companies.
Such bars could be appropriate in cases such as WorldCom and
Enron, where public reports reveal that the directors were asleep at
the switch and thus failed to prevent their corporations' massive
frauds. 274 Yet former directors of these failed companies continue to
serve as directors of other public companies. 2 75 This suggests that the
force of reputational sanctions that purportedly discipline directors is
muted. Similarly, public reports on the financial crisis suggest that
Citigroup's directors were in the dark about the extent of its
subprime exposure, preventing them from managing growing risks
and ensuring the accuracy of Citigroup's financial reports. 276
Likewise, Lehman's directors were seemingly unaware of the Repo

272.

Samuel W. Buell, PotentiallyPerverseEffects of CorporateCivil Liability, in

PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE
CONDUCT 92 (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) ("Not only does an

SEC settlement not match the criminal action's tendency to ascribe the label of
wrongdoer to a firm, it ascribes nothing."); see also DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES
LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 651 (2003) (noting the SEC's common practice of
settling cases by allowing defendants to avoid admitting liability). Recently, the SEC's
longstanding practice of allowing defendants to settle cases without admitting liability
has attracted sharp judicial criticism and the attention of Congress. See Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., No. 11-7387, 2011 WL 5903733, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 28, 2011) (rejecting proposed SEC settlement as "neither fair, nor reasonable, nor
adequate, nor in the public interest.., because it does not provide the Court with a
sufficient evidentiary basis to know whether the requested relief is justified under any
of these standards"); Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507,
509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that the proposed settlement is not fair or reasonable
even applying the most deferential standards); Peter Schroeder, Lawmakers to Press
SEC to Change Rules on Settlements for Wrongdoing, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2012, 6:00
AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-fnancial-institutions201915-lawmakersto-press-sec-to-change-rules-on-settlements-for-wrongdoing (reporting the scheduling of
hearings to review the SEC's settlement practices).
273.
Regina F. Burch, Unfit to Serve Post-Enron, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 1081, 1084
(2008).

274.
See generally BREEDEN, supra note 141 (reporting on directors' lapses
leading up to WorldCom's failure); POWERS, supra note 141 (reporting on Enron
directors' lapses leading up to the firm's demise).
275.
See Steven M. Davidoff, Despite Worries, Serving at the Top Carries Little
Risk, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2011), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/despiteworries-serving-at-the-top-carries-little-risk (noting directors of firms that failed
during the 2008 financial crisis continue to serve as directors of other public
companies, including leading financial institutions).
276.
FCIC, supra note 80, at 260-65; see also Dash & Creswell, supra note 77, at
Al (describing Citigroup executives' ignorance of the scope of the firm's subprime
exposure).
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105 transactions that the company used to shed billions of dollars of
2 77
assets and debts from its balance sheet at the end of each quarter.
Yet despite the financial calamities facilitated in part by their
ignorance, directors of these firms have not been held personally
accountable for their failures.278
Federal governance reforms included in Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank place new obligations on independent directors. 279 For
such provisions to have meaning there must be a way to hold
directors accountable when they fail to meet these heightened
conduct standards. Unfortunately, neither Sarbanes-Oxley nor DoddFrank created mechanisms for enforcing these new obligations.
Because states have refrained from enforcing oversight duties, it may
be appropriate to expand the SEC's authority in this realm. The SEC
already
has
authority
to
scrutinize
directors'
oversight
performance. 280 To the extent that Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank, and
other federal reforms create additional obligations for directors, it
makes sense to allow a federal agency to monitor directors'
performance and maintain a federal standard of conduct for
Congress's conception of a director's role.
Although current problems plaguing the SEC undermine faith in
its ability to protect investor interests, expanding its jurisdiction to
cover directors' duties could result in a more efficient use of scarce
resources. The SEC could use this power as an ancillary tool in
ongoing investigations, achieving better investor protection with
minimal additional costs. The risk exists that the SEC would be
tempted to use its expanded powers to pursue a political agenda and

277.
See Valukas, supra note 141, at 732-35 (describing the misleading effect of
Lehman's accounting for its "Repo 105" transactions).
278.
See Davidoff, supra note 275 (noting that in a twenty-six year period, only
nine directors had been held personally liable for securities fraud); Norris, supra note
270, at Bi (noting that corporate directors who were supposed to be watching over
management are rarely held accountable). Several outside directors of Citigroup and
Lehman remain subject to ongoing securities litigation in connection with inaccuracies
in their companies' financial statements during the run-up to the crisis. See In re
Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (claiming
that directors knew of false and misleading statements relating to Lehman's Repo 105
transactions); In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F. Supp. 2d 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(asserting claims against directors for overstating the company's assets).
279.
Just as it responded to the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 by
specifying in Sarbanes-Oxley certain tasks directors must perform, Congress adopted
the Dodd-Frank Act in response to the 2008 Financial Crisis. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Like
Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank includes significant governance reforms designed to
enhance director oversight of compensation and risk. Although Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank created new responsibilities for directors, the statutes do not include
mechanisms to hold directors accountable for their performance. Instead, Congress left
the task of monitoring director conduct firmly in state hands.
280.
See supra text accompanying notes 267-69.
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make an example out of high-profile corporate leaders. 28 ' Although
such a risk is present, creating a regulatory "middle ground" between
no civil charges and criminal referrals could better protect prominent
directors from politically motivated prosecutions. 282
3.

State Enforcement

According to the traditional division of authority in corporate
regulation, federal law governs corporate disclosure obligations, and
states set substantive conduct standards for officers and directors.
Although overbroad and imprecise, this conceptual divide creates
barriers for expanding SEC authority to regulate director conduct.
Thus this section explores the possibility of relying on states to
provide a better system for holding directors accountable for
corporate oversight. There are two possible avenues for enhancing
states' authority to police director misconduct. First, an executive
agency such as the attorney general might be granted authority to
investigate and bring cases for oversight failures. Second, state
judges could impose alternative remedies to traditional damage
awards in cases involving a breach of the duty of oversight.
a.

Administrative Action

Allowing state authorities to enforce oversight duties and impose
officer and director bars could be an alternative to enhanced SEC
enforcement of director oversight. For example, a state's attorney
general could investigate director oversight failures and seek
penalties or bars in appropriate circumstances. Because corporate
law is often perceived of as private law, such powers may seem
unusual. However, the exercise of such authority would be a mere
extension of existing state power to enforce fiduciary duties.
As the law currently stands, state regulators can enforce the
duties of directors of charitable organizations, including nonprofit
corporations. 28 3 In most states, the attorney general exercises this

281.
Martha Stewart comes readily to mind. See generally MARTHA STEWART'S
LEGAL TROUBLES (Joan McLeod Heminway ed., 2004) (describing and analyzing the
U.S. government's actions against domestic maven Martha Stewart for insider trading,
obstruction of justice, and lying to investigators).
282.
See Buell, supra note 272, at 95 (arguing for enhancing the severity of
sanctions for corporate fraud imposed through civil proceedings to make civil actions
more attractive to public regulators as an alternative to criminal charges); cf. Christine
Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 368 (2008) ("[C]ivil
law and criminal law in the corporate law arena must be harmonized to restore the
traditional policy preferences of allowing free access to the civil courts while harnessing
prosecutorial power.").
283.
Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 938 (2004).
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authority as parens patriae.284 Extending authority to cover directors
of for-profit corporations could thus be seen as a natural extension of
the attorney general's existing powers.
Although the notion is contested, the public purpose of the business
corporations has long been acknowledged. 28 5 Most commentators accept
that corporations and their officials bear some responsibility to
promote the public interest. 286 Furthermore, the social impact of
major corporate failures, plant shutdowns, and widespread layoffs
has pushed legislatures and courts to acknowledge the public purpose
of corporations. Thirty states have adopted so-called "other
constituency" statutes acknowledging directors' authority to consider
the interests of employees, communities, and other stakeholders
when making business decisions. 28 7 Allowing state attorneys general
to enforce the fiduciary duties of directors of business corporations
would be consistent with this public conception of the corporation.
Objections to this proposal could emerge along at least two lines. On
one hand, state attorneys general have not been particularly aggressive
in enforcing duties of directors of charitable institutions.2 8 8 Although

284.
Id.; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 785-86 (noting that this
supervision may not be enough to ensure that a trustee of a charitable organization
does not breach a fiduciary duty).
285.
For a classic account discussing directors' fiduciary obligations to a
corporation, see generally E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). See also A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98
A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953) (holding that corporations have the authority to reasonably
contribute to charity).
Cox & HAZEN, supra note 7, at 88-89; see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
286.
GOVERNANCE, ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.01(b) (Revisions to the Proposed
Final Draft 1992) ("Even if corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby
enhanced, the corporation in the conduct of its business (1) Is obliged to the same
extent as a natural person to act within the boundaries set by law; (2) May take into
account ethical considerations that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the
responsible conduct of business; and (3) May devote a reasonable amount of resources
to public welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes.").
287.
JEFFREY D. BAUMAN ET AL., CORPORATIONS LAW AND POLICY 116-17 (5th
ed. 2003). Delaware has not enacted an "other constituency" statute; however, its
supreme court has acknowledged directors discretion to consider the interests of
stakeholders when responding to hostile takeover attempts. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) ("[The defensive measure] entails an
analysis by the directors of the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the
corporate enterprise. Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
"constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and
perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality
of securities being offered in the exchange."). In a later decision the court qualified this
statement by making clear that for the interests of other constituencies to be validly
considered they must be "rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."
Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law,
288.
CorporateLaw, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 622-24 (1999) (describing the
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attorneys general have intervened in instances of large-scale abuse,
they generally lack both the resources and the motivation to
28 9
vigorously enforce the duties of nonprofit corporation directors.
Such concerns may be muted with respect to business corporations,
where citizens may be hungering for public enforcement action and
thus more likely to provide political and budgetary support for
enforcement of directors' duties.
A contrasting objection to expanding attorneys general's
enforcement powers might stem from a lack of trust in the attorney
general's political motivations. 290 In recent years, commentators have
expressed concern with the "zealousness" of recent New York
Attorneys General Eliot Spitzer and Andrew Cuomo, both of whom
pursued Wall Street firms on fraud charges and then used the AG's
office as a stepping stone to the governor's office. Of course, if an
attorney general's enforcement practices are popular enough that
voters reward his enforcement efforts by electing him to higher office,
it seems somewhat odd to criticize their efforts in that regard.
b.

Judicial Remedies

If the attorney general's office is deemed ill-equipped to take on
the additional burden of enforcing directors' duties, state judges could
assume the mantle. For example, with little change to current
practice, judges could impose director bars as a remedy in traditional
shareholder litigation. Even when a court concludes there is
insufficient evidence of bad faith to impose monetary liability for
breach of duty, a court could issue an injunction against future
director service upon a finding of inadequate oversight. 29 1 After all,
§ 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law proscribes only
monetary damages for due care breaches, allowing for actions for
2 92
injunctive relief based upon the gross negligence standard.

challenges faced by attorney generals when enforcing the duties of charitable
directors).
289.
See Brody, supra note 283, at 939 ("[Flew state attorneys general have the
funding and inclination to engage in aggressive charity enforcement."); Garry W.
Jenkins, IncorporationChoice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41
GA. L. REV. 1113, 1128 (2007) (explaining that lack of resources and low staffing levels
contribute to criticisms of permissive oversight).
290.
See Brody, supra note 283, at 946 (quipping that AG is known to stand for
"aspiring governor").
291.
The SEC's legislative authority to impose bars was granted in recognition
of the courts' use of injunctive powers to bar individuals from future violations of the
securities law. See Carlson, supra note 267, at 682-84 (discussing the development of
the SEC injunction and the five-factor test employed to determine likelihood of
recurrence).
292.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011). Delaware courts regularly
consider actions for injunctive relief based on directors' alleged breach of fiduciary duty
in connection with proposed acquisitions.
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If an action for a judicial order banning future service were
sanctioned by the state.s, lawyers would continue to bring cases
alleging breach of the duty of care and would be entitled to attorneys'
fees in appropriate cases. For corporate jurisprudence to play a
meaningful role in shaping corporate norms, as many commentators
claim it does, there must be cases to adjudicate. 293 However, the
for lawyers to file claims
current doctrine provides little incentives
2 94
duties.
oversight
of
breach
a
alleging
C. Federalism'sConundrum
Expanding judicial remedies for oversight breaches might be the
reform most faithful to existing federalism boundaries. However,
states may be reluctant to pursue this remedy for fear of alienating
managers and losing the corporate franchise. The nature of interstate
competition for corporate charters thus makes it unlikely that states
would embrace such a change. 29 5 Whether one views the competition
for corporate charters as creating a race to the top or a race to the
bottom, most commentators agree that such competition inevitably leads
to management-friendly policies. 29 6 Because corporate managers have
the power to select the state of incorporation, states can be expected
to resist any reforms that threaten the comfort level of directors,
absent the prospect of more onerous federal legislation along similar
297
lines.

Miller, supra note 94, at 329. Professor Miller suggests another alternative
293.
to adjudicating oversight claims. He proposes that in certain circumstances judges
conduct judicial inquiries into allegations of due care breaches upon the motion of an
intervenor. Id. at 336. The purpose of the judicial inquiry would be to determine
whether a breach occurred, not to determine liability. Id. at 338. Professor Miller
argues that such inquiries would preserve a judicial role in establishing conduct
standards for directors, which the courts' current doctrines have essentially eliminated.
Id. at 336-41.
Id. at 329 (stating that obstacles to success in derivative litigation mean
294.
few lawyers will bring due care cases).
See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections
295.
upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (envisioning the competition for corporate
charters as a "race to the bottom"); Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (discussing
the interstate competition for corporate charters as "a race to the top").
See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 63-65 (1976)
296.
(explaining that state chartering is a "revenue game between states" which has
increased the American corporation's power); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 14-15 (Christopher C. DeMuth & Jonathan R. Macey eds.,
1993) (discussing the effect of corporate charter competition and identifying the
common position that firm-demanded laws result); Winter, supra note 295, at 255
(explaining that as state corporate law has developed, management now faces fewer
restrictions).
See Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of
297.
CorporateReform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 629 (2004) (urging sustained federal engagement
on corporate governance issues as a check against Delaware's tendency toward laxity).
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Thus, while states might be the most appropriate locus for the
reforms advocated here, they are also the level of government least
likely to adopt them. Ironically, then, the best way to prod states to
consider the reforms discussed here would be to advocate for their
adoption at the federal level, even though expanding federal
regulation requires further trampling of closely held federalism
ideals.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has proposed implementation of a public
enforcement system for the fiduciary duties of directors of U.S.
corporations. It reasons that a credible accountability mechanism is a
necessary element of a regulatory regime that aims to promote
optimal compliance levels. In the United States, private fiduciary
duty litigation represents the principal mechanism for director
accountability. However, due to doctrinal and procedural hurdles,
such litigation fails to provide for real accountability.
In Australia, ASIC has the power to enforce directors' statutory
duties, including the duty of care. The public enforcement system
exists alongside the private shareholder derivative lawsuit.
Australia's public enforcement system offers several advantages over
the American approach. First, Australian law allows the regulator to
undertake enforcement action when it is in the public interest to do
so. Second, Australian law provides the regulator with a range of
possible remedies when enforcing statutory duties, including
disqualification orders and pecuniary penalties. Disqualification
orders allow for the removal of incompetent directors, and pecuniary
penalties allow for the imposition of penalties that are calibrated to
the level of director culpability. Finally, the system of public
enforcement overcomes many of the objections to private shareholder
litigation in the United States, including fear of strike suits and
disproportionate damage awards.
For these reasons, the public enforcement model deserves careful
consideration in the United States. The imposition of civil penalties
for fiduciary violations could serve as an important disciplinary
function that is currently absent from the U.S. corporate law regime.
Adopting such a model in the United States would not be easy.
Obstacles to implementation include questions of federalism, the
traditional conceptual divide between corporate and securities law in
the United States, and the absence in the United States of a system
for public enforcement of directors duties. Despite these conceptual
barriers, it is time for U.S. policymakers to consider implementing a
public enforcement system for directors' fiduciary duties.

